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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 15, 1989, a day on which many people in the 
United States commemorated the sixtieth birthday of the Rev. Dr . 
• B.A. 1988, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; J.D. 1992, Boston College Law 
School. David Baron is an associate at the law firm of Ropes & Gray, in Boston, MA. The 
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lawrence Friedman and the editorial board 
of the Boston College Third World Law Journal. He would also like to thank Professors Daniel 
Kanstroom and Renee M. Landers for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this 
article. 
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Martin Luther King, Jr., a fifteen-year-old black girl was brutally 
raped in Detroit. l Identified as "Jane Doe" in the Michigan press 
and in the court documents surrounding her case, the teenager was 
visiting her aunt in the eastern part of Detroit when three adult 
men broke into her aunt's apartment. 2 Jane was attacked by all 
three of the men, who beat and raped her repeatedly. 
Several days after the attack, Jane discovered that she was 
pregnant.3 Unable to afford an abortion out of her mother's 
monthly welfare income of $421,4 Jane and her mother tried to 
schedule an abortion at a clinic or hospital that would accept pay-
ment through Medicaid.5 When they learned that Michigan had 
recently enacted a law prohibiting the use of Medicaid funds for 
abortion in cases not involving life-threatening pregnancy, Jane and 
her mother enlisted the help of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) to challenge the new abortion funding restriction in the 
Michigan state courts.6 
Central to Jane Doe and the ACLU's case, Doe v. Babcock,' was 
the claim that statutory restrictions on abortion unconstitutionally 
discriminate against women of color like Jane Doe.s Grounding this 
claim in an emerging body of demographic research tending to 
show the disparate racial impact of abortion restrictions, Jane Doe 
and the ACLU claimed that the Michigan restriction on public 
funding for abortion worked an invidious form of discrimination 
by the state against constitutionally protected classes of minority 
citizens.9 Although this discrimination-based argument was not the 
only basis advanced by Jane Doe and her attorneys for the Michigan 
1 Eileen McNamara, Abortion I An American Divide, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1989, at 1. 
2 Kathleen Boland & Steve Marshall, Teen Rape Victim Stirs Abortion Debate, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 24, 1989,at3A. 
3 McNamara, supra note 1, at 1. 
4Id. Abortions cost $250 at most Detroit hospitals. For Jane Doe, however, who suffers 
from an "unevaluated and undiagnosed seizure disorder," Doe v. Director of Dep't. of Social 
Servs., 187 Mich. App. 993, 497 n.2 (1991), rev'd, 439 Mich. 650 (1992), the necessary 
procedures totalled $1000. jane's age and history of seizures also entailed substantial risks 
to her health were she to continue her pregnancy to term. Id. 
5 Medicaid is a program that is jointly funded by the federal and state governments to 
provide necessary medical services for the poor. 
6 Rape Victim Seeks Medicaid Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1989, at 3. 
7 No. 89-904749-CZ (Circuit Court Mar. 17, 1989), rev'd sub nom. Doe v. Director of 
Social Servs., 187 Mich. App. 493 (1991), rev'd, 439 Mich. 650 (1992). 
8Id. at 11-13. 
9 See Doe v. Director of Mich. Dep't. of Social Servs., 187 Mich. App. 493, 523-25 (1991) 
rev'd, 439 Mich. 650 (1992). 
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statute's invalidity, it figured strongly in the party's overall effort 
before the Michigan Supreme Court to have the restriction struck 
down on constitutional grounds. 10 
Doe v. Babcock is not the first case in which statutory restrictions 
on abortion have been challenged as a form of government-spon-
sored discrimination against a constitutionally protected group.ll 
Particularly in the area of funding restrictions, advocates in the 
federal courts have also argued that the disparate impact of abortion 
restrictions on women and women of color violates the Constitu-
tion's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."12 Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court of the United States has moved seemingly closer 
with each new opinion to no longer recognizing (or, at any rate, no 
longer enforcing) a "right to choose abortion"13 under the tradi-
to Id. The claims of Jane Doe and the ACLU were based on the protections of the 
Michigan Constitution, however, and therefore bear only an analogous relationship to the 
issues raised in this article. 
11 See, e.g., Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae, 
passim, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter 
NCADV Brief]; Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as 
Amici Curiae, at 12-16, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-
605); Brief of Amici Curiae 274 Organizations in Support of Roe v. Wade, passim, Turncock 
v. Ragsdale, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989) (No. 88-790) (appeal dismissed per stipulation sub nom.), 
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (No. 88-805) [here-
inafter 274 Organizations Brief]; see also Glen Elsasser, Abortion Painted as a Sex-Bias Issue, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1989, at 27. 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
13 Despite the Court's purported "reaffirmation" of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), it is beyond question that the Court went further in that opinion 
toward abandoning any recognizable "right" to an abortion than it has in any of its recent 
encounters with the abortion question. Explicitly, the Court reversed two of its settled deci-
sions in the abortion area by allowing (1) a mandatory 24-hour waiting period for abortion, 
id. at 2825-26 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 
449-51 (1983)), (2) a requirement that doctors provide patients with information designed 
to influence the patient'S choice between childbirth and abortion, Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-
24 (overruling Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 759-65 (1986); Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-45), (3) a requirement that information 
relative to a patient's decision between childbirth and abortion be furnished by a physician 
rather than a qualified assistant, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (overruling Akron, 462 U.S. at 446-49), 
and (4) a requirement that physicians record specific information concerning each patient's 
background and each abortion performed, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33 (overruling Thornburgh, 
476 U.S. at 765-68). More striking, however, was the Court's reversal of much that was 
essential to the holding in Roe: the trimester framework for evaluating statutory restrictions 
on the abortion right and the applicability of "strict scrutiny" to statutory impingements on 
the abortion right itself. 112 S. Ct. at 2816-21. That the Court had the keen sense of irony 
to cast this bold retreat from Roe in terms of the doctrine of stare decisis should not-and, by 
all indications, will not-dissuade those on either side of the abortion debate from viewing 
the Court's opinion in Casey as yet another step toward the eventual dismantling of Roe. See 
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tional rubric of substantive due process,14 such alternate bases for 
striking down abortion-restricting legislation have been raised by 
abortion advocates with ever-increasing frequency.15 
Challenges to statutory restrictions on abortion that have been 
based or based in part upon constitutional principles of equal pro-
also Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding Title X provisions prohibiting doctors 
and other personnel in facilities receiving Title X funds from engaging in abortion counsel-
ing, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning); Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
Dissenting in Webster, Justice Blackmun argued that the fears of abortion advocates for 
the future of the abortion right are eminently justified by the Court's present direction: 
Today, Roe v. Wade, and the fundamental constitutional rights of a woman to decide 
whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are not secure. Although the Court 
extricates itself from this case without making a single, even incremental, change in 
the law of abortion, the plurality [Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.l and 
Justice Scalia would overrule Roe . .. and would return to the States virtually 
unfettered authority to control the quintessentiaIly intimate, personal, and life-
directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term .... 
Webster, 492 U.S. at 537-38, 560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In addition, 
the anti-abortion stance of the last two presidential administrations, Laura S. Stepp & Ann 
Devroy, Bush Cites Abortion "Tragedy" in Call to 67,000 Protestors, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1989, 
at Al ("I think the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was wrong and should be 
overturned. I think America needs a human life amendment.") (statement of President Bush); 
the increasingly conservative composition of the lower federal courts, Eileen McNamara, If 
Permitted, Many States Would Ban Most Abortions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1989, at 14 (President 
Reagan appointed more than half of the federal bench during his terms in office; most of 
these judges share his pro-life views); and the advanced age of Justice Blackmun-the author 
of the majority opinion in Roe and, with Justice Stevens, one of its last supporters-further 
suggest that abortion-rights advocates are justifiably concerned that the Court may withdraw 
its traditional support for the abortion right in future holdings. In light of the Court's most 
recent holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791 (1992), however, its withdrawal from the abortion controversy seems likely to proceed 
incrementaIly rather than summarily. See also Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia J., concurring) 
("It ... appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion-law, constructed overnight 
in Roe v. Wade, must be dissembled door-jamb by door-jamb .... "). 
14 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the right to an abortion is "encompassed" 
by a woman's constitutional right of privacy, 410 U.S. at 153, a right which is in turn protected 
by the Constitution's guarantee of "liberty" under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, c1. 3. See, 
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). ChaIlenges to statutory restrictions on abortion 
have generally involved courts in refining one of these two central aspects of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Roe. Both with respect to funding restrictions and administrative restric-
tions on the access of women to abortions, the abortion controversy in United States law has 
traditionally turned on the Court's substantive definition of "liberty" under the Due Process 
Clauses and its designation of abortion and privacy as "fundamental rights" within the 
meaning of this broad constitutional guarantee. 
15 See sources cited supra note II. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a group of 
amici representing a broad range of minority interests framed its essentially rights-based 
defense of Roe v. Wade in decidedly equal protection terms: 
While women of all classes and colors will be endangered by any dismantling of the 
constitutional framework of Roe v. Wade, ... the burden will fall most heavily and 
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tection have primarily focused on issues of unconstitutional gender 
discrimination; 16 although in a few cases, particularly in the area of 
abortion funding, advocates have also relied to some degree on 
evidence of disparate racial impact. 17 This article focuses on the 
legal underpinnings of this latter category of claims-those for 
which the case of Doe v. Babcock offers a representative fact pattern. 
Such challenges to restrictions on the public funding of abortion 
argue, in the most general terms, that abortion-restricting legislation 
of this type works a form of invidious discrimination against women 
of color that is (or, rather, should be) prohibited by the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection. 
This article observes that, although available demographic data 
tend strongly to indicate that restrictions on the public funding of 
abortion severely and predictably harm black women and other 
women of color in a manner disproportionate to their impact on 
women in the United States as a whole, constitutional antidiscrimi-
nation law in its current form does not support a claim that takes 
the disparate racial impact of public funding restrictions as its basis. 
Taking this aspect of the abortion funding controversy as an entry-
point into the wider universe of current equal protection jurispru-
dence, this article further suggests that the expected failure of race-
based equal protection claims in the abortion funding context is the 
necessary result of other, deeper, doctrinal failures that have 
emerged in the Supreme Court's administration of the Equal Pro-
inexorably on poor women, a vastly disproportionate number of whom are women 
of color-African-American, Latino, Native American and Asian. 
Brief Amici Curiae of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc., et. al. at 2-4, Webster, 492 
U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) [hereinafter Civil Rights Brief] (citation omitted). Also in Webster 
and in the recently-settled case, Turnock v. Ragsdale, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989), groups of amici 
have suggested that equal protection would be an appropriate legal basis for the Supreme' 
Court to rely on in continuing to protect the abortion right even if due process and the right 
of privacy are no longer seen as "encompassing" such a right. But see James Bopp, Jr., Will 
There Be a Constitutional Right to Abortion After the Reconsideration of Roe v. Wade?, 15 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 131 (1989). 
16 But see CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 249-51 n.21 (1987) (arguing 
that many plaintiffs have raised the issue of gender discrimination, but few have made it 
essential to their challenge, and that discrimination based on race or wealth have more 
frequently been squarely tested as bases for challenging abortion-restricting statutes). 
17 See, e.g., Civil Rights Brief, supra note 15; see also Plaintiffs' and Proposed Intervenors' 
Amended Complaint, McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (No. 1804), rev'd 
sub nom., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (raising the issue of racial discrimination but 
apparently disregarding it before the Supreme Court). As Professor Laurence Tribe has 
noted, however, until relatively recently the ACLU has been reluctant to advance the abortion 
restrictions it has challenged in court. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 15-10, at 1353 n.109 (2d. 1988). 
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tection Clause. That such claims are virtually certain to fail under 
current equal protection doctrine is taken throughout as an analyt-
ical and, to some extent, normative paradigm for examining the 
doctrine's constitutional adequacy. IS 
A clear presentation of the factual case demonstrating the ra-
cially disparate impact of abortion funding restrictions is thus cru-
cial to every part of this analysis. In Part II, data illustrating the 
disproportionate burden of funding restrictions on black women 
and other women of color will be presented and discussed in some 
detail. With these data as a foundation, Part III will then present 
an overview of equal protection analysis in the abortion funding 
context under existing law, parsing out both the "fundamental 
rights" and "suspect classification" components of this analysis. In 
Part IV, by focusing primarily on the "suspect classification" or 
"invidious discrimination" aspect of modern equal protection law, 
it will be argued that the principles the Court has evolved for 
adjudicating claims of racially disparate impact virtually require the 
rejection of such claims in the abortion funding context. Part V will 
draw from the analysis and legal commentary set forth in Parts III 
and IV in ultimately offering a principle for the Court's adminis-
tration of the Equal Protection Clause that, it will be suggested, 
more adequately and defensibly addresses the reality of racially 
disparate impact. 
II. RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACT OF ABORTION FUNDING 
RESTRICTIONS: THE FACTUAL CASE 
Since 1982, the federal government has restricted the use of 
federal funds for abortion to cases in which the woman's life would 
be endangered by carrying her pregnancy to term. 19 In practice, 
18 This analysis does not, however, address legal arguments which either attempt to 
establish or proceed from the supposition of a fetal "right to life." Although the Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized a state interest in promoting childbirth, the Court has never 
linked this interest to any proffered "right" of a fetus to be born. See Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) Can abortion is not the 
termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. From this holding [in Roe], 
there was no dissent; indeed, no member of the Court has ever questioned this fundamental 
proposition") (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Such arguments, if they 
are to be addressed fairly, require a level of exposition and justification that is simply beyond 
the scope of this article, even to the extent that much of what is advocated herein might be 
legitimately criticized by those who believe deeply in a fetus' "right to life." 
19 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-377, sec. 204, 96 Stat. 1894 (1982). Thirty states 
and the District of Columbia also restrict the use of state Medicaid funds for abortion only 
to cases of life-threatening pregnancy: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, 
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this restriction means that federal funding is available to indigent 
woman seeking abortions in approximately 0.1 % of all cases. 20 Some 
states, however, have continued to provide additional Medicaid cov-
erage for abortion under less restrictive circumstances, such as in 
cases of rape or incest, or where there is a substantial risk to ma-
ternal health or of severe fetal abnormality.21 
The assertion that women of color suffer disproportionately 
under restrictions on the public funding of abortion services turns 
on two distinct, although related, empirical observations concerning 
women of color in the United States: first, that women of color are 
vastly overrepresented among the poor22 and the extreme poor23 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Rachel 
Benson Gold & Daniel Daley, Public Funding of Contraceptive, Sterilization, and Abortion Services, 
Fiscal Year 1990, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 210 (1991). 
20 Gold & Daley, supra note 19, at 210. In 1990, combined state and federal funding of 
abortion services for low-income women totalled $65 million. [d. Of this amount, federal 
funding accounted for nearly 0.2%, at $119,000. [d. 
21 In 1990, 14 states provided funding for abortion under the "medically necessary" 
standard. An abortion is defined as "medically necessary," generally, when childbirth or 
continued pregnancy pose a significant risk to the physical or psychological health of the 
mother, as determined by a physician. Rachel B. Gold & Sandra Guardado, Public Funding 
of Family Planning, Sterilization and Abortion Services, 1987, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228, 232 
(1988). Five states are under court order to provide funding for all medically necessary 
abortions: California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont; eight states do 
so voluntarily: Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, 
and West Virginia. Gold & Daley, supra note 19, at 210. In addition, seven states which do 
not fund medically necessary abortions offer public funding for abortion services under less 
severe restrictions than the federal government, such as for cases of rape or incest, fetal 
defect, or psychiatric conditions representing a threat to the life of the woman: Colorado, 
Iowa, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. [d. 
22 In 1991, the poverty rate for blacks in the United States was 32.7%. U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, Poverty in the United States: 1991, CURRENT POPULATION REp., Series P-60, No. 
181, at 1 (1992). The percentage of black families living in poverty was higher if the head 
of the household was a woman, and higher still if the household included minor children. 
[d. at 1, 18. Also, in 1991 fully 49.7% of all Hispanic families headed by women lived below 
the federal poverty level. [d. at 1. Hispanic persons in the United States, as defined by the 
Census Bureau, are primarily persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Central and South 
American descent. U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Hispanic Population in the United States: 
March 1988, CURRENT POPULATION REP., Series P-20, No. 438 (1989). The figures for race 
and families living below the poverty level in 1991 show that families of color are 3.3 to 3.5 
times more likely than white families to live in conditions of poverty. See Poverty in the United 
States: 1991, supra, at 1. 
23 Even in comparison to white families subsisting below the federal poverty level, black 
and Hispanic families living in poverty often suffer more extreme forms of deprivation. For 
example, one representative sample of homeless families in New York City found these 
families to be 54% black, 40% Hispanic, and only 6% "other." Beth C. Weitzman, Pregnancy 
and Childbirth: Risk Factors for Homelessness?, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 175, 176 n.* (1989). 
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in this country (and thus disproportionately in need of public assis-
tance generally); and second, that women of color are substantially 
more likely than white women to seek and obtain abortions at some 
point during their lifetimes.24 Each of these observations has been 
well-documented over the last decade, and a sample of the available 
data has been set out in the footnotes. Taken independently, the 
disparity between women of color and other women in their need 
for abortion services and in their relative ability to pay for these 
services is striking. What is perhaps most remarkable, however, is 
that when income and the need for abortion services are examined 
together, the gap between women of color and other women grows 
even wider, such that the disparity between women of color and 
other women in their need for abortion services is highest among 
women who are least able to afford an abortion. 25 
24 In the last decade, the number of abortions obtained by women in the United States 
has remained stable at approximately 1.6 million. Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, 
Abortion Services in the United States, 1987 and 1988,22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 102, 103 (1990). In 
1987, 31.4% of all abortions in the United States were obtained by "non-white" women, a 
proportion which has also remained fairly constant over this period. Stanley K. Henshaw & 
Jane Silverman, The Characteristics and Prior Contraceptive Use of u.s. Abortion Patients, 20 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 158, 159 (1988); Stanley Henshaw et al., Abortion Services in the United States, 
1978-1979,13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 6,15 (1981). Adjusted for population, the data generated 
by these studies indicate that an Hispanic woman is 60% more likely than a white woman to 
have an abortion during her lifetime, Henshaw & Silverman, supra, at 158, whereas a "non-
white" woman generally is twice as likely. Stanley K. Henshaw, Characteristics of u.s. Women 
Having Abortions, 1982-1983, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 5, 8 (1987). Although it is impossible with 
studies of this type to pin down the precise reason women of color seek and obtain abortions 
so much more frequently than white women, one factor significantly affecting both the 
abortion rate and birth rate of women of color is that their pregnancy rate (number of 
pregnancies/1000 women) is twice as high as that for white women, a statistic which has 
remained constant since 1978. 1d. at 8. Reasoning from abortion rates and rates of unwanted 
childbirth among women in the United States, it is also logical to conclude that the rate of 
unintended pregnancy is similarly much higher for women of color. [d.; Unwanted Childbearing 
in the United States Declines, But Levels Still High Among Blacks, Singles, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 
274,274 (1985). 
25 The disparity in the need for abortion services is highest among teenagers, Stanley K. 
Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Teenage Abortion, Birth and Pregnancy Statistics: An Update, 21 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 85, 86 (1989); James Trussell, Teenage Pregnancy in the United States, 20 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 262, 264 (1988), Medicaid recipients, Henshaw & Silverman, supra note 
24, at 162, and single mothers. Stanley K. Henshaw et al., A Portrait of American Women Who 
Obtain Abortions, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 90, 94 (1985). The pregnancy rates and abortion rates 
of black 15 to 19 year-olds, for example, are consistently twice as high as the rates of their 
white counterparts-a statistic that is comparable to the disparity between black and white 
women generally. The disparity between extremely young white and "non-white" teenagers, 
however, is arrestingly greater than this cumulative average: in 1985, the abortion rate for 
women of color under age 15 was 5.4 times that for white women in the same age group, 
while the birthrate for women of color in this group was 6.5 times as high. Henshaw & Van 
Vort, supra at 86. To appreciate the magnitude of this problem, consider that, in 1988, half 
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Because these disparities in the need for abortion services pre-
cede, at least analytically, the imposition of any statutory ·abortion 
restriction, it is also essential to assess the impact of funding restric-
tions on the options that remain available to women of color after 
such restrictions are imposed. If a woman of color is faced with an 
unwanted pregnancy in one of the thirty-seven states that have 
"restrictive" funding statutes,26 she may choose to pursue one of 
four possible options: (1) she might try to qualify for public funding 
under the restrictive statute, (2) she might use her own money to 
pay for a legal abortion, (3) she might use her money to pay for a 
cheaper, illegal abortion, or (4) she might decide to carry her preg-
nancy to term.27 Each of these options will be considered in turn. 
A. Qualifying for Public Funding 
While a Medicaid-eligible woman might find the possibility of 
qualifying for public funding for an abortion to be the most prac-
tical in terms of cost, it is also the least likely option to be available 
to her. Of the 743,090 abortions reported in any of the states with 
restrictive funding laws,28 only 0.11 % were publicly funded in fiscal 
year 1987.29 Of the thirty-seven states with restrictive funding laws, 
thirty are "life only," meaning that a woman is required to produce 
a doctor's certification that her life will be endangered by continuing 
her pregnancy in order to qualify for funding through Medicaid.30 
Foreseeable complications of pregnancy or childbearing, which arise 
in six of every ten cases,3l may make a woman's abortion "medically 
necessary" in that they may threaten her with substantial and even 
permanent injury. Under the Hyde Amendment and the "life only" 
restrictions of thirty states and the District of Columbia, however, 
of all women under the age of 20 who gave birth were both poor and unmarried. Trussell, 
supra at 263. 
26 "Restrictive" states are defined under this analysis as all states that provide funding 
under more stringent conditions than the "medically necessary" standard. See supra notes 
19-21 and accompanying text. 
27 Richard M. Selik et aI., Effects of Restricted Public Funding for Legal Abortions: A Second 
Look, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 77, 77 (1981). 
28 Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 24, at 104. 
29 Gold & Guardado, supra note 21, at 232. This percentage of publicly funded abortions 
may be artificially inflated due to misreporting of procedures following miscarriages as 
abortions. /d. 
30 Jd. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
31 LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 103 (1990). 
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such risks to a woman's health are not sufficient to qualify her for 
a publicly funded abortion.32 
Even in the six restrictive states that additionally provide ex-
ceptions for cases of rape or incest,33 a minuscule number of women 
who are eligible under these provisions actually obtain publicly 
funded abortions.34 Although it is possible that the underemploy-
ment of statutory exceptions for rape and incest is attributable to 
the strictness with which state officials administer these provisions, 
a more likely explanation is that women themselves may be unaware 
of the complexities in their state's abortion funding law or else 
unwilling to admit that their pregnancy is the result of rape or 
incest. Given that all but one of these statutes require a woman to 
promptly report whether she has been the victim of rape or incest 
to state law enforcement agencies,35 it would not be surprising if 
many women felt deterred from attempting to qualify for public 
funding in states with this kind of restriction. 
B. Paying Jor an Abortion Out-oj-Pocket 
While raising the money for an abortion may be barely feasible 
in many cases, it is nevertheless an option which many women, 
particularly those who are at risk for serious (but non-life threat-
ening) health complications, feel compelled to pursue.36 In 1989, 
the average cost a woman paid in a clinic or physician's office for a 
first-trimester abortion was $231.37 Raising a sum of money this 
32 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-377 § 204, 96 Stat. 1894 (1982). See Williams v. 
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980); McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 661-68 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Harris, 448 U.S. at 326. 
33 These states are: Iowa, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 
(Colorado, the seventh less restrictive state, only allows funding in cases of physical or 
psychological life endangerment). Gold & Guardado, supra note 21, at 232. These seven states 
provided zero funding for abortion services in 1987. [d. 
3. See Rachel B. Gold & Jennifer Macias, Public Funding of Contraceptive, Sterilimtion and 
Abortion Services, 1985, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 264 (1986) (Iowa and Virginia, which also 
provide an exception in cases of severe genetic defect in the fetus, funded 52 abortions in 
1985. The remaining four states-Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-paid 
for no abortions.). 
35 See Minn. Stat. § 256B0625(16)(c) (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(C)(2) (1989); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-92.1 (1982); WIS. STAT. § 20.927(2)(a) (1977); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-117 
(1985). 
36 Of Medicaid-eligible women seeking to obtain an abortion, 75 to 80% elect and even-
tually are able to pay for an abortion themselves. RACHEL B. GOLD, ABORTION AND WOMEN'S 
HEALTH: A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICA? 52 (1990)(unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Alan Guttmacher Institute). 
37 [d. at 51. The cost of a first trimester abortion can vary greatly from state to state and 
even from facility to facility. The maximum cost for a first trimester abortion in 1986 was 
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large-more than half the average monthly income of a family on 
Medicaid38-can have severe effects on the life of a Medicaid-eligible 
woman, forcing her and her family to give up money for food, 
clothing, utilities, and other basic necessities.39 One study has found 
serious consequences of this nature in 58% of the cases where 
Medicaid-eligible women pay for an abortion out of their own 
funds. 40 
Medicaid-eligible women are also much more likely to delay 
obtaining an abortion while they raise the money to pay for the 
procedure, a course of action that may be both costly41 and physi-
cally dangerous.42 One poll of Medicaid-eligible women found that 
these women most frequently delayed an abortion past the tenth 
week of pregnancy because they needed time to raise the money.43 
The study concluded that, because of this delay, nearly one-quarter 
of Medicaid-eligible women who otherwise would have obtained an 
abortion in the first trimester44 were forced to postpone the pro-
cedure into the second trimester.45 Particularly where access to legal 
$900. Stanley Henshaw et aI., Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 63, 63 (1987). 
38 GOLD, supra note 36, at 51. 
39 Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Services for 
the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 171 (1984); see also GOLD, supra note 36, at 52. 
40 Id.; see also james Trussell et aI., The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financingfor Abortion, 
12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120, 129-30 (1980). 
41 The problem a woman of color may have in raising money for an abortion may trap 
her in a vicious circle of rising costs. In 1982, only 32% of all abortion providers (37% of all 
public and private hospitals) reported that they would perform an abortion after the first 
trimester, while the vast majority of those providers who would perform second and third 
trimester abortions reported that they charged more money for the procedure. Stanley 
Henshaw, jacqueline D. Forrest & Ellen Blaine, Abortion Services in the United States, 1981 and 
1982, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 125, 126 (1984). See infra note 46. 
42 The risks of major complications and death rise markedly after the first trimester, and 
studies have shown that the risk of death begins to rise 30% for every week past the eighth 
week of gestation, and that the risk of major complications rises 20% for every week past 
this point. Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 39, at 171. This is so because abortion deaths are 
most often caused by infectious complications (sepsis), which are significantly more likely to 
result when the fetus is larger and more developed and when the abortion is incomplete. 
Delay, Limited Access Found Key Factors in Septic Abortion Deaths, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 46, 47 
(1981); see also David A. Grimes, Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 260, 263 (1984). 
43 Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 39, at 170. 
44 The "first trimester" is usually defined as the stage of pregnancy prior to the twelfth 
week; the "second trimester" is the stage of pregnancy between approximately the thirteenth 
week and the point at which the fetus becomes "viable" (approximately the twenty-fourth to 
twenty-sixth week). See Grimes, supra note 42, at 260-61. 
45 Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 39, at 170; see also Aida Torres & jacqueline D. 
Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 175 (1989) (29% of all 
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abortion is geographically limited,46 black women, teenagers, and 
women covered by Medicaid are significantly more likely than 
others to delay an abortion well into the second trimesterY 
C. Paying for an Illegal Abortion 
Although illegal abortions are often less expensive than those 
performed by a licensed physician in a clinic or hospital, they are 
also far less safe for the woman. It is not necessary to recount the 
horrific stories of "back-alley abortions" performed in the years 
prior to Roe to recognize that illegal abortion is not now and has 
never been a viable alternative for low-income women who would 
terminate their pregnancies.48 Nonetheless, estimates of the num-
bers of illegal abortions obtained in the United States between 1975 
and 1979-a period following the Supreme Court's decision in Roe 
but encompassing the passage of the first Hyde Amendment49 in 
1977-range from 5,000 to 23,000.50 During this period, deaths 
due to illegal abortion were fifteen times higher among black 
women and eleven times higher among Hispanic women than 
among white women,51 such that, together, black women and His-
panic women accounted for 82% of illegal abortion deaths in the 
United States. 52 An estimated one-third of the women who obtained 
illegal abortions between 1975 and 1979 chose that option because 
they could not afford a legal abortion or because legal abortion 
providers were not available in their areas. 53 
women who delayed an abortion past the sixteenth week did so because they lacked the 
money to pay for an abortion earlier in their pregnancy). 
46 In areas with limited access to abortion services, the real cost of an abortion must 
additionally be computed as including travel costs, meals, lodging, time missed from work, 
day care, and so forth. In 1987,31 % of all women in the United States lived in counties with 
no abortion provider at all. Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 24, at 106. 
47 Torres & Forrest, supra note 45, at 174; Late Abortions Linked to Education, Age and 
Irregular Periods, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 86, 86 (1981). 
48 See generally TRIBE, supra note 31, at 27-51; JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: 
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); LAWRENCE LADER, 
ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973). 
49 Pub. L. No. 94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976). 
50 Nancy Binkin et aI., Illegal-Abortion Deaths in the United States: Why Are They Still Occur-
ring?, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 163, 163 (1982). See also Alissa J. Rubin, Throwing Babies, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 26, 1992, at 19. 
51 Binkin, et aI., supra note 50, at 164. In the years prior to Roe, black women and 
Hispanic women died from illegal abortions at 23 times and nine times the rate of white 
women, respectively. Id. 
52 See id. at 166. 
53 Id. at 163. 
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D. Carrying an Unwanted Pregnancy to Term 
The original sponsor of the Hyde Amendment, Representative 
Henry Hyde (R.-Ill.), had hoped that the federal government's 
restriction of Medicaid funding for abortion services would serve 
to compel the poorest women in the United States to give birth 
rather than terminate their pregnancies. 54 Several independent 
studies of Medicaid-eligible women in the United States have found 
that the Hyde Amendment accomplishes this result about one-quar-
ter of the time-effectively denying abortions to 25% of Medicaid-
dependent women (perhaps the poorest quartile).55 
In assessing the impact of funding restrictions on the actual 
number of women in the United States who are forced into un-
wanted childbirth, it is illustrative to compare abortion statistics in 
the years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe with those 
from the present day. Accepted estimates of the yearly number of 
legal and illegal abortions performed in the United States in the 
1960s fall between l.0 and l.5 million. 56 Compared with the current 
number of 1.6 million abortions per year, and adjusted for popu-
lation, these estimates suggest that the criminalization of abortion 
did surprisingly little to deter women who sought abortions from 
obtaining them through whatever-often dangerous and illegal-
means were available. 57 Strangely, however, restrictions on the fund-
54 "I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a 
rich woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle 
available is the HEW Medicaid bill. A life is a life." 123 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H6083 (daily 
ed. June 17, 1977) (statement of Rep. Henry]. Hyde). 
55 Aida Torres et aI., Public Benefits and Costs of Government Funding for Abortion, 18 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. Ill, 117 (1986); Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 39, at 171; Trussell et aI., 
supra note 40, at 129; see also GOLD, supra note 36, at 51 (range of 20 to 25% of women 
unable to pay for an abortion therefore carry unwanted pregnancies to term). 
56 See NCADV Brief, supra note 11, at 17 (citing LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION 2 (1966) 
("recent" estimate of 1.5 million); JEAN VAN DER TAK, ABORTION, FERTILITY, AND CHANGING 
LEGISLATION 72-73 (1974) ("round figure" prior to Roe of one million); Kenneth R. Whitte-
more, The Availability of Non-Hospital Abortions, in ABORTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 217 
(Robert E. Hall ed. 1970) ("oft-quoted" figure of one million is a "reasonable estimate"); and 
RICHARD SCHWARTZ, SEPTIC ABORTION 7 (1968) (estimate in late 1960s of 1.2 million)). 
57 Evidence also suggests, however, that to the extent the criminalization of abortion in 
the years prior to Roe did prevent women from obtaining abortions, this burden fell most 
heavily on poor women and women of color. In New York City between the years of 1960 
and 1962, the therapeutic abortion rate for the city as a whole was 1.8 per 1,000 live births, 
2.6 per 1,000 for white women, 0.5 per 1,000 for black women, and 0.1 per 1,000 for Puerto 
Rican women. Judith E. Belsky, Medically Indigent Women Seeking Abortion Prior to Legalization: 
New York City, 1969-1970, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 129, 129 (1992) (citing E.M. Gold et aI., 
Therapeutic Abortions in New York City: A 20-Year Review, 55 AM.]. OF PUB. HEALTH 964 (1965)). 
In addition, data from New York hospitals in the years prior to Roe consistently showed a 
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ing of abortion do appear to have had a measurable impact on the 
number of births and abortions obtained in funding-restricted 
states. Based on data from other states with similar legislation, the 
director of the Michigan Department of Social Services estimated 
that 20% of Medicaid-dependent women seeking abortions would 
be forced to give birth under Michigan's new funding restriction.58 
These data indicate that, at least with respect to the most eco-
nomically disadvantaged members of society, the real-world effects 
of abortion funding restrictions may not be very different from 
those of outright statutory bans on abortion in the years prior to 
Roe. The cause of this startling similarity may be traceable to the 
relative cost and availability of abortion services under each kind of 
statutory regime. Prior to Roe, there is at least anecdotal evidence 
that some physicians took it upon themselves to offer cheap, illegal 
abortions to patients who did not want or could not afford to give 
birth. 59 In the present day, by contrast, relatively "safe" alternatives 
to legal abortion are almost nonexistent. Thus, if cost currently 
prohibits a woman from obtaining an abortion at hospitals or clinics 
(which sometimes offer reduced rates for indigent women), there 
simply may be no safe or inexpensive alternatives available to her 
apart from giving birth-an option which, of course, her Medicaid 
coverage would pay for. 
Several recent studies indicate that a woman who is able to 
obtain an abortion in the first trimester takes about one-seventh the 
risks of health complications and death that she would by giving 
birth.60 This objective risk, however, may not be of paramount 
concern to a pregnant woman who is forced into unwanted child-
birth. Far more salient in a woman's subjective assessment of her 
situation are likely to be the overall burdens in loss of income, 
substantially higher incidence of abortions performed for psychiatric reasons among private 
patients in private and voluntary hospitals than among ward patients and patients in munic-
ipal hospitals. Id. In 1959, of 96 therapeutic abortions reported by 11 teaching hospitals in 
New York City, only one was performed on a black patient, although 27% of obstetric patients 
served by these hospitals were black. Id. (citing Alan F. Guttmacher, Induced Abortions, 63 
N.Y. ST. J. OF MED. 2334 (1963}). 
58 McNamara, supra note 1, at l. The Michigan funding restriction has since been struck 
down by the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Doe v. Director of Michigan Dept. of Social 
Servs, 187 Mich. App. 475 (1991). 
59 See TRIBE, supra note 31, at 35, 38; Roger Rosenblatt, Welcome to Uncomfortable Times, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,JUI. 17, 1989, at8. Also, because of the greater demand for illegal 
abortions in this period, it is possible that information on "less hazardous" methods for self-
inducing abortion was more widely available. 
60 Researchers Confirm Induced Abortions to Be Safer For Women Than Childbirth: Refute Claims 
of Critics, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 271, 271 (1982) [hereinafter Abortion Safer Than Childbirth]. 
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inability to support her family, loss of mobility, inability to work, 
and impingements on other aspects of individual autonomy that 
she expects will accompany the birth of an unwanted child. Unfor-
tunately, the degree to which a woman who is forced to give birth 
feels these aspects of her life are compromised by unwanted child-
birth is not measurable by the kinds of demographic statistics that 
confine this analysis. 61 Nevertheless, the subjective hardship of 
forced childbirth warrants special mention, and a great deal more 
empathic consideration than it can possibly be given here, as it is 
doubtless the defining characteristic of this fourth option. 
Women who receive some form of public assistance and carry 
an unwanted pregnancy to term are at much greater risk for be-
coming homeless or caught in the so-called "welfare trap" than 
publicly-assisted women who choose and are financially able to 
abort. 62 A 1978 national survey oflow and marginal-income women 
served by a government family planning program concluded that 
39% of these women "would become dependent on AFDC [Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children] if they were to have an un-
planned birth."63 Although it is true in general that a woman who 
carries her pregnancy to term takes a greater health risk than a 
woman who aborts her pregnancy in the first trimester,64 lack of 
prenatal care and greatly reduced access to gynecological services 
puts women of color at a substantially greater risk when they choose 
(or are compelled) to give birth.65 In sum, a woman of color who is 
61 The impressions of one woman in such a situation cannot possibly suffice, but perhaps 
lend some perspective to this final option: 
Why does the government want hungry children in the world? ... [W]e live in this 
society, where you have to have a place to stay, everyone needs a house. Then they 
say you have to have your body covered, which means you need clothing. Nobody 
gives you anything to eat. You have to eat food .... I see people eating steak on 
television, and my children are eating chicken backs and chicken necks. 
Byllye Avery, A Question of SurvivallA Conspiracy of Silence: Abortion and Black Women's Health, 
in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 76 (Marlene 
G. Fried ed., 1990). 
62 [d. at 176. 
63 Unplanned Pregnancy is Main Cause of Welfare Reliance, Survey Finds, 13 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 186 (1981). This finding has been corroborated by other studies, which have found 
that only 5% of AFDC mothers ever receive any form of public assistance before they conceive 
their first child. [d. Black teenage mothers who receive AFDC are more likely still to be 
dependent on AFDC at age 26 than those who do not have a child. Greg J. Duncan & Saul 
D. Hoffman, Teenage Welfare Receipt and Subsequent Dependence Among Black Adolescent Mothers, 
22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 16, 16 (1990); see generally Laurie Schwab Zabin et aI., When Urban 
Adolescents Choose Abortion: Effects on Education, Psychological Status and Subsequent Pregnancy, 
21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 248 (1989). 
64 Abortion Safer Than Childbirth, supra note 60, at 271. 
65 For live births, the maternal mortality rate of nonwhite women is three times that of 
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faced with an unsafe, unaffordable, or simply unwanted pregnancy 
in any of the thirty-six states that restrict abortion funding assumes 
a disproportionately weightier burden no matter which of the avail-
able options she chooses. 
The racially disparate impact of abortion funding restrictions 
is compellingly clear and seems at first glance to be well suited to a 
demand for judicial relief by women of color. Abortion advocates 
note that the factual data on abortion-funding restrictions reveal an 
unsubtle correlation between persons who suffer most acutely un-
der these restrictions and socioeconomic groups in the United States 
that have traditionally been least successful in gaining access to 
political power.66 In a recent brief before the Supreme Court, one 
group of amici reasoned that correlations of this type define pre-
cisely the situation in which the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution is most naturally applicable; that governmental actors 
and others in positions of power should not "too casually trade away 
for others key liberties that they are careful to reserve for them-
selves" and for other members of their race and class.67 
Under prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, such 
functional definitions of constitutional equal protection are simply 
white women. Maternal, Infant Mortality Rates Remain Far Higher for Blacks Than Whites, 16 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 40, 40 (1984). Nonwhite women, furthermore, are nearly six times more 
likely to die from an "abortive outcome" than white women. Id. "Abortive outcomes" are 
defined as one of the following: ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous abortion, or induced abor-
tion.Id. 
Because of the physical danger, emotional trauma, and expense to the mother when her 
pregnancy results in a child that dies shortly after birth, and because of the poor access many 
women of color have to adequate obstetric, neonatal, and postnatal care, it is appropriate 
also to consider the increased risk of neonatal death and infant death that a woman of color 
confronts when she is financially compelled to give birth. Although the overall infant mortality 
rate has decreased dramatically in the United States over the past 30 years, the child of a 
black woman is still twice as likely to die in the first year of life as a white child. Jeannette 
Johnson, U.S. Differentials in Infant Mortality: Why Do They Persist?, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 227, 
230 (1987). Like many of the racial and ethnic disparities that have been assessed in this 
section, the difference in the infant mortality rates of black children and white children 
seems to be a function of enduring socioeconomic differences between these two groups. 
66 See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights, 29 CAL. RPTR. 866,877 n.21 (1981). 
67 274 Organizations Brief, supra note 11, at 18. Justice Jackson once expressed a similar 
view of the Equal Protection Clause in Railway Express Agency v. New York: 
The Framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there 
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon 
a minority must be imposed generally. 
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (concurring opinion). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 183 (1980) ("constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where 
representative government cannot be trusted"). 
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not the stuff of majority opinions. Rather, as the balance of this 
article will explore in detail, the principles currently governing the 
Court's administration of the Equal Protection Clause have made it 
virtually impossible for claims arising from the type of real-life racial 
disparities described in this section to trigger a constitutional re-
sponse. The Court, which once held that the constitutional guar-
antee of "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection 
of equal laws,"68 today will permit laws to escape judicial scrutiny 
that deprive even the most basic interests of constitutionally pro-
tected groups, and that subject members of these groups to statutory 
burdens unparalleled among members of the political majority, so 
long as they are not "discriminatory" within the Court's perplexing 
definition of the word.69 For this reason, race-based challenges to 
abortion funding restrictions, like the gender-based and poverty-
based challenges that preceded them, will invariably fail. Incapable 
of responding to real-world conditions of inequality like those de-
scribed in this section, the Equal Protection Clause in its present 
formulation has become a mocking abstraction for those who still 
suffer for the color of their skin and for their history of political 
and economic disempowerment. In the context of abortion funding, 
an examination of the method by which this transmogrification of 
the doctrine has taken place, an analysis of its impact on constitu-
tional jurisprudence, and a proposal for restoring a principled and 
manageable connection between the doctrine and its substantive 
underpinnings occupy the remainder of this discussion. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT: 
GOVERNMENT'S NON-OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ABORTION SERVICES 
TO INDIGENT WOMEN 
Harris v. McRae70 was among the first cases in which the Su-
preme Court considered the equal protection issues raised by re-
strictions on the public funding of abortion. 7l In Harris, a class 
action was brought against the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare to enjoin enforcement of the "Hyde Amendment"-a sup-
plement to the 1980 Medicaid appropriations bill that cut off federal 
funding under Title XIX for all "abortions except where the life of 
68 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
fi9 This definition will be carefully examined in Part IV. 
70 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
71 See generally Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 
(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beat v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
18 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 1 
the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; 
or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of 
rape or incest .... "72 Plaintiffs were a class of Medicaid recipients,73 
abortion providers, and religious organizations who challenged the 
federal funding restriction, inter alia, as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment's implied guarantee of equal protection.74 
The crux of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim in Harris was 
that the unequal funding scheme provided for in the Hyde Amend-
ment-allowing disbursement of federal Medicaid funds for sub-
stantially all medically necessary services for the poor (including 
necessary services associated with childbirth), but cutting off fund-
ing for medically necessary abortions75-invidiously discriminated 
against indigent women by foreclosing their constitutionally pro-
tected decision to obtain an abortion.76 In particular, the plaintiffs 
argued that, by removing the exception for "instances where severe 
and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result 
if the pregnancy were carried to term,"77 Congress had arbitrarily 
chosen to penalize the exercise of the abortion right among a nar-
row and politically powerless class of persons: indigent, Medicaid-
dependent women facing serious risks to their health.78 The U.S. 
District Court found this last argument compelling, particularly with 
respect to teenagers at a high risk for complications resulting from 
unintended pregnancy, and enjoined enforcement of the Hyde 
Amendment.79 
72 Pub. L. No. 96-123 § 109,93 Stat. 926 (1979). The 1981 version of the Hyde Amend-
ment required a woman to report having been raped to a law enforcement agency within 72 
hours to qualify for public abortion funds. Pub. L. No. 96-369 § 101(c), 94 Stat. 1352 (1980). 
The 1982 version, still in effect, prohibits the funding of abortion in all cases except where 
the life of the mother is threatened. There are no exceptions for rape or incest. Pub. L. No. 
97-377 § 204, 96 Stat. 1894 (1982). 
73 Plaintiffs also included four individual Medicaid recipients who had been unable to 
obtain medically necessary abortions when they were denied funding under the Hyde 
Amendment. Harris, 448 U.S. at 304. 
74 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (Fourteenth Amendment guarantee 
of equal protection applicable to federal government through "liberty" component of Fift.h 
Amendment Due Process Clause). 
75 Harris, 448 U.S. at 321-22. 
761d. at 312. 
77 See Pub. L. No. 95-480 § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978) (1979 version of Hyde Amendment); 
Pub. L. No. 95-205 § 101,91 Stat. 1460 (1977) (1978 version of Hyde Amendment). 
78 Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. 
79 McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 661-80, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (discussing in detail the likely adverse medical conse-
quences of the Hyde Amendment on teenage women). 
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The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stewart held that the Hyde Amendment neither "impinged" upon 
any "fundamental right" secured by the Constitution80 nor discrim-
inated against any judicially recognized "suspect class."81 Under 
80 Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-18. Government action that impinges upon the "fundamental" 
rights or interests of a particular class of individuals will violate equal protection if such 
action is not "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." See, e.g., Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ("fundamental right" to travel interstate); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-70 (1966) ("fundamental right" to equal access 
to the franchise). This level of judicial review is known as "strict scrutiny," under which 
government bears the burden to show, first, that its actions serve a purpose that is not only 
"legitimate" under the Constitution but also sufficiently "compelling" to justify the govern-
ment in tampering with the rights of a class of individuals; and second, that it has chosen 
means that are not only "rationally related" but "necessary" to effect this purpose and "least 
restrictive" to individual rights of all means available. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670. 
A lower level of review, usually applicable to government regulation of purely economic 
matters, is the "minimum rationality" or "rational basis" standard. Williamson v. Lee Optical 
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-91 (1955). Under this standard, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving either that the government's actions do not further a "legitimate governmental 
purpose" or that, if the government does have a legitimate purpose for its actions, it has 
chosen means that are not "rationally related" to the attainment of this purpose. See, e.g., 
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 83 (1911). Although the Court in the last 20 years has 
adhered less rigidly to this "two-tiered" system of judicial review, it is still often true that the 
choice between strict scrutiny and minimum rationality is effectively dispositive of a plaintiff's 
claim under equal protection of due process. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term-Foreword: In Search of the Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1,8 (1972) (strict scrutiny usually '''strict' in theory and fatal in 
fact"); see also infra note 88. 
81 Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-23. If government classifies individuals for unequal treatment 
according to criteria that are constitutionally "suspect," the basis for that classification will be 
subject to strict or "the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944). Although the characteristics that will render a particular criterion "suspect" under 
equal protection are not altogether clear from the Court's holdings, the Court has always 
held racial and ethnic classifications to be categorically of this type. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). Even 
during the period when the Court was reluctant to extend the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to other minority groups, black citizens were held to be the persons "for whose 
protection the Amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made 
against them by law because of their color .... " Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 
(1879). 
In addition, the Court has applied an intermediate standard of judicial review-one not 
quite so permissive as minimum rationality and not so surely fatal as strict scrutiny-to a few 
specific types of statutory classifications: those based upon gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), illegitimacy, Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 
(1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), and alienage, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982). When government deliberately classifies individuals according to one of the "quasi-
suspect" criteria, and imposes burdens upon the selected group it does not impose generally, 
the classification will be upheld unless it fails to serve "important governmental objectives" 
or is not "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
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both prongs of traditional equal protection analysis, the Court thus 
held that the Amendment withstood the plaintiff's facial challenge 
because it bore a "rational relationship to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of protecting potentiallife."82 
The Court first addressed the "fundamental rights" component 
of the plaintiff's claim under the rubric of "substantive due pro-
cess,"83 finding that the Hyde Amendment did not burden or re-
strict the right recognized in Roe v. Wade84 merely because it denied 
certain women access to abortion.85 Although Roe had established 
the right to choose an abortion as an aspect of a woman's "funda-
mental" right to privacy, the Court reasoned that the government 
did not "impinge" upon this right merely by failing to make medi-
cally necessary abortions economically obtainable.86 Thus, for pur-
poses of both its due process and equal protection analysis,87 the 
Court held that the "fundamental right" to choose an abortion was 
not compromised by restrictions that left "an indigent woman with 
the same range of choice . . . as she would have had if Congress 
had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all."88 
82 Harris, 448 U.S. at 325. 
83 "Fundamental rights" analysis under the Equal Protection Clause is somewhat confus-
ing for its similarity, in methodology if not in scope, with that used to discern "fundamental 
rights" under the rubric of "substantive due process." Although 20 years have passed since 
the observation was first made, it still seems fair to assume that, at a minimum, "every interest 
found to be fundamental and therefore protected by the due process clause will also be 
fundamental under the Equal Protection Clause .... " Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 
82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1130 (1969). Thus, for example, to the extent that a woman's right 
to an abortion is encompassed by the "fundamental" right of privacy under the Due Process 
Clause, it would appear to be logically no less protected by the guarantee of equal protection. 
The doctrine of "fundamental rights" under the Equal Protection Clause, however, is far less 
certain. In the absence of a "suspect classification," the Court has recognized protected 
interests under equal protection that range from the right to vote in state elections, see, e.g., 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670, and the right to equal ballot access, see, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 33-34 (1968), to the right to a first appeal on a criminal conviction, see Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963), and the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942). How far these cases go in defining a sphere of equal protection that is 
beyond the protection of due process, and whether there is an emergent principle for 
determining which sorts of rights will be protected independently by equal protection, is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
84 410 U.S. Il3 (1973). 
85 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18. 
86 [d. at 316. But cf Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973) (appellants' argument that 
statutory restrictions on abortion access "have produced invidious discriminations" need not 
be addressed by the Court, because the provisions complained of have already been found 
invalid under due process). 
87 Doe, 410 U.S. at 322. 
88 [d. at 317. 
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Under the second prong of its equal protection inquiry, the 
Court found that the Hyde Amendment did not single out any 
group for special disadvantage according to criteria that were con-
stitutionally "suspect."89 In making this determination, the Court 
drew on a series of cases in which it had previously held that the 
Equal Protection Clause does not generally prohibit classifications 
based on wealth.90 Most recently, in Maher v. Roe,91 the Court had 
upheld against a similar challenge by a class of indigent women a 
Connecticut welfare regulation barring the use of public funds for 
"nontherapeutic" (that is, elective) abortions.92 In Harris, although 
the plaintiffs argued that the Hyde Amendment's denial of funding 
even for "medically necessary" abortions promised far more severe 
consequences for indigent women,93 the Court found no reason to 
deviate from this recent precedent: 
Here, as in Maher, the principal impact of the Hyde Amendment 
falls on the indigent. But that fact does not itself render the 
funding restriction constitutionally invalid, for this Court has 
held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect 
classification .... That ... the present case involves the refusal 
to fund medically necessary abortions, has no bearing on the 
factors that render a classification "suspect" .... 94 
Reasoning that the Hyde Amendment thus worked no form of 
unconstitutional discrimination under either the "suspect classifi-
cation" or "fundamental rights" component of equal protection law, 
the Court concluded that the Amendment passed constitutional 
muster by bearing merely a "rational relationship" to the legitimate 
governmental objective recognized in Roe of "protecting potential 
life. "95 
89 ld. at 323. 
90 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982) (legislation violates equal 
protection which tends to create a "permanent caste" or "underclass" of illiterates); Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (right to marry cannot be abridged on the basis of ability 
to pay child support obligation from past marriage); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 
(1964) (if a state provides elections, it may not discriminate against certain voters based on 
wealth). 
91 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
92ld. at 466-67. 
9, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). 
94ld. at 323. 
95ld. at 325. Note that this description of the government's purpose in passing the Hyde 
Amendment-and the characterization of that purpose as "legitimate"-is not a mere for-
mality in Harris, as it is in many cases where the "minimum rationality" test is used. By 
22 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 1 
Nine years after Harris, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices,96 the Court made clear that its decisions in the abortion-fund-
ing context applied equally to all forms of public support for abor-
tion that a government might choose to withdraw.97 In Webster, 
although the Court acknowledged that comprehensive restrictions 
on the use of public facilities and public employees for abortion 
services would, in all likelihood, put the cost of abortion out of 
reach for many indigent women,98 again it did not find that these 
restrictions encroached upon the right to an abortion recognized in 
Roe.99 Rather, the Court reasoned from its earlier holdings in the 
Medicaid-funding context that such restrictions by a state govern-
ment "[left] a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State 
had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all."lOO Thus, in 
Webster, the Court strongly reaffirmed its position that, even where 
restrictions on public funding admittedly impede access to abortion 
services, and thus foreclose the right to choose an abortion for some 
women, such restrictions are a rational method for government to 
express "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."lol 
concluding categorically that the government's restriction of public funding for abortion 
neither impinged the abortion right nor discriminated against any judicially-recognized 
"suspect class," the Court's prior analysis had suggested that Congress might have legislated 
this restriction for any reason whatsoever. Presumably, however, had Congress enacted the 
Hyde Amendment for the specific purpose of forcing Medicaid-dependent women into 
unwanted childbirth, thereby undermining Roe, or out of a specific desire to deny the 
constitutional rights of indigent women, the restriction would have failed under any standard 
of judicial review. But see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
96 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
97Id. at 509-10. Webster involved a due process challenge to a Missouri statute that made 
it unlawful, inter alia, "for any public employee within the scope of his employment to perform 
or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother," Id. at 507 (citing Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 188.215 (1986» and "for any public facility to be used for the purpose of performing 
or assisting an abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother." /d. (citing Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 188.210 (1986». The plaintiffs argued that these provisions of the Missouri statute 
went well beyond the passive expression of governmental policy that the Court had held 
permissible in Harris and the other abortion funding cases. Id. at 503, 509. 
Particularly as the statute defined "public facility" as "any public institution, public facility, 
public equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any 
agency or political subdivision thereof," id. at 540 n.l (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (citing Mo. 
REV. STAT. § 188.200 (1986», the plaintiffs argued that courts might literally interpret the 
statute to bar even private physicians in private hospitals from performing abortions in some 
instances-for example, where a private hospital were "located on ground leased from a 
political subdivision of the state." Id. 
98Id. at 509; id. at 523 (O'Connor, j., concurring). 
99 Id. at 509; id. at 523-24 (O'Connor, j., concurring). 
wOld. at 509. 
wild. at 509-10 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977». 
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From the perspective of abortion funding, the 1990 case Rust 
v. Sullivan102 represented a similar foreseeable expansion of the 
principles articulated in Harris and Webster. In Harris, the Court had 
held that the right recognized in Roe did not forbid a legislature 
from withholding public funds to pay for abortion services-even 
medically necessary abortion services.103 In Webster, the Court had 
held that the right did not forbid a legislature from withholding 
public funds from facilities that continued to provide abortion ser-
vices, even if the patients in these facilities paid for abortions them-
selves.104 By simply extending this definition of the abortion right 
fashioned in these cases, the Court in Rust held that a woman's right 
to obtain an abortion did not forbid a legislature, through its agents 
in the executive branch, from withholding public funds from family 
planning facilities that "provide counseling concerning the use of 
abortion ... provide referral for abortion ... or encourage, pro-
mote, or advocate abortion as a method of family planning."105 
The Court's holdings in Harris, Webster, Rust, and the other 
abortion funding cases raise a number of recurring and difficult 
questions with respect to the Court's definition of the abortion right. 
In Roe v. Wade,106 the Supreme Court held that a woman's right to 
102 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
103 See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
105 111 S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(a)( 1) & 59.IO(a) (1989». Writing for the 
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist drew the connection to the Court's earlier holdings in the 
abortion-funding area explicitly: 
Just as Congress' refusal to fund abortions in McRae left "an indigent woman with 
at least the same range of choice ... as she would have had if Congress had chosen 
to subsidize no health care costs at all," and "Missouri's refusal to allow public 
employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with 
the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals," 
Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a woman with 
the same choices as if the government had chosen not to fund family planning 
services at all. 
[d. at 1777 (citations omitted). 
Of course, plaintiff's challenge in Rust also involved a significant first amendment chal-
lenge to the federal "gag rule" on family planning facilities-a challenge which focused in 
particular on the need (and the traditional recognition of the need) for candid and open 
discussion between a doctor and a patient. III S. Ct. at 1771-76. Although an extensive 
discussion of this challenge is simply not possible here, it is instructive to note in passing that 
the Court addressed these freedom of speech concerns in a manner almost identical to its 
treatment of the right to an abortion in the cases discussed in this section. Indeed, the Court 
quoted extensively from its decisions in the abortion funding context in discarding the 
plaintiff's first amendment challenge in Rust, noting that a "refusal to fund a protected 
activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 
[d. at 1772. 
106 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
24 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 1 
an abortion is "fundamental," encompassed by the broad "penum-
bral" right of privacy; 107 and in each of the abortion funding cases 
the Court has purported to adhere to this precedent--carefully 
noting that its current holding leaves the right recognized in Roe 
"undisturbed."108 But the Court has also acknowledged in each of 
these subsequent cases that statutory restrictions on the public fund-
ing of abortion "may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, 
impossible-for some women to have abortions."109 Indeed, the 
Court has in some cases gone so far as to acknowledge, albeit 
obliquely, that funding restrictions are usually enacted for the very 
reason that they will put abortion out of reach for some women 
without the necessity of enacting direct restrictions on abortion 
access that would, presumptively, violate the Court's holding in 
Roe. lIo As such, it is difficult, at least at a purely functional or 
intuitive level, to discern what manner of "fundamental right" the 
Court ultimately conceives the right to choose an abortion to be. 
Doctrinally, the funding cases provide an answer: a government 
does not "impinge" upon the abortion right merely by failing to 
ensure the universal availability of abortions. But positing a thresh-
old "impingement requirement,"lll and grafting this requirement 
107 [d.; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965) ("specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras"); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,210-15 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
108 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) (today's decision "signals no retreat from 
Roe"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (quoting "no retreat" language approvingly); 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (statute "affords us no 
occasion to revisit the holding of Roe . .. and we leave it undisturbed"); see also Webster, 492 
U.S. at 526 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And 
to do so carefully. "). 
109 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; see also Webster, 492 U.S. at 509 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 
474); Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 
521 (1977). 
110 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 325. By "obliquely," I mean the Court has occasionally dem-
onstrated its awareness that restrictions on abortion funding translate into fewer abortions 
and more births just like direct, impermissible, restrictions on abortion access. The Court 
noted that "Congress has established incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alter-
native than abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid. These incentives bear a direct rela-
tionship to the legitimate congressional interest in protecting potential life." /d. See also Beal 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (state has an interest in "encouraging normal childbirth"); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,478 n.ll (1977) ("In addition to the direct interest in protecting 
the fetus, a State may have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population 
growth"). 
111 Susan F. Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the 
Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. 
L. REv. 721, passim (1981). Professor Appleton argues that, in the years following the 1977 
abortion-funding cases, lower courts consistently misinterpreted the Court's position on 
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onto the abortion right, only begs the more functional, realistic 
question of whether abortion can be understood as a "right" at all-
much less a "fundamental right"-if government may deliberately 
and selectively deny access to abortion to a narrow, politically in-
consequential, segment of society. More than merely ignoring this 
obvious functional question, the Court's distinction between gov-
ernment action that "makes ... it impossible" to exercise a right 
and action that "impinges"112 upon that right seems designed pur-
posely to excuse the Court from dealing with the abortion right in 
any principled, coherent, or substantive way. Yet, even if the im-
pulse to avoid this difficult and impassioned discussion through 
impenetrable legalisms is in some sense understandable,113 surely 
any effort to deal with the abortion right realistically-even one 
that were manifestly unacceptable to some segment of society-
would be preferable to a jurisprudence in which the nature and 
substance of the right are left entirely to speculation. That these 
questions are posed by women who, in the abortion funding context, 
face real and immediate hardship at the hands of their government, 
only makes the necessity for judicial candor in the area of abortion 
more pressmg. 
funding restrictions; thinking that these holdings, like Roe, turned on a judicial balancing of 
the state's legitimate interest in protecting fetal life and a woman's interest in obtaining an 
abortion. [d. at 740-46. The error in these lower court opinions, Appleton observes, is that 
they failed to identify the language of "entitlement" and "positive/negative" rights analysis 
that ran throughout Harris and the 1977 cases. [d. at 734-35 & nn. 98, 99. Focusing on this 
aspect of the funding cases, it is clear that the Court was not at all concerned with what 
interest the government had in restricting abortion funding (it may even have sought, 
inexplicitly, to increase the number of "abnormal births"), but rather with the limited char-
acter of the abortion right itself, which the Court concluded government could not "im-
pinge"-whatever its purpose-by merely failing to ensure the accessibility of abortion. [d. 
at 734-740. Appleton correctly predicted that this reformulation of the Court's "fundamental 
rights" analysis would have a profound impact on all substantive "rights" protected under 
the rubric of substantive due process. [d. at 753-58. Specifically, Appleton foresaw the Court's 
new direction as utterly inconsistent with the aspirations of Professor Frank Michelman's 
"welfare-rights thesis." [d. at 753-57. Compare Frank Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Consti-
tutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 664-85 (the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
"basic welfare interests" to the extent necessary to ensure universal participation in democratic 
system) with DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) 
(the Due Process Clause is a limitation on the state's power to act, not "a guarantee of certain 
minimal levels of safety and security"). 
li2 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. 
li3 Cf Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2878 
(1992) ("Consciously or not, the joint opinion's verbal shell game [in formulating the new 
'undue burden' standard] will conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is 'appro-
priate' abortion legislation") (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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The failure of indigency-based challenges to restrictions on 
abortion funding does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a 
successful equal protection challenge based on race. The right to 
an abortion by itself, however, is no more likely to trigger strict 
scrutiny under the "fundamental rights" component of equal pro-
tection than it was in the early abortion-funding cases. The "fun-
damental" nature of the abortion right cannot, presumptively, de-
pend on the group to whom funding restrictions deny abortions. It 
follows, therefore, that any chance of success such claims have in 
challenging funding restrictions must depend solely on whether 
race is a more adequate legal basis than indigency for obtaining 
strict scrutiny under the "suspect classification" component of equal 
protection. An exploration of the law governing race-based chal-
lenges of this general type will be taken up in the next section. 
IV. THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF EQUAL PROTECTION: "SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATION" AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
Doe v. Babcock114 is not the first case in which abortion advocates 
have raised the disparate racial impact of abortion funding statutes 
as the basis for an equal protection challenge. In Doe, however, as 
in every other case where racially disparate impact has been argued, 
courts ruling on the constitutionality of funding restrictions have 
unfailingly chosen to ground their opinions elsewhere, usually in 
the law of substantive due process. In Webster, one group of amici 
argued the cause of racially disparate impact quite forcefully, draw-
ing on many of the same types of medical and demographic studies 
that were used to frame this discussion in Part 11.115 It was therefore 
somewhat surprising-even granting that the parties themselves did 
not raise the issue-that the Webster Court devoted not so much as 
a footnote to addressing the impact of Missouri's public support 
restrictions on women of color. This failure to acknowledge the 
racially disparate impact of abortion funding restrictions is partic-
ularly curious in light of the Webster Court's specific focus on the 
related claims of wealth discrimination by indigent women. 116 
The remainder of this discussion will be devoted to an expli-
cation and subsequent analysis of the Court's expected reasoning 
114 Doe v. Babcock, No. 89-904749-CZ (Wayne County Circuit Court Mar. 17, 1989), 
rev'd sub nom. Does v. Director of Dep't of Social Servs., 187 Mich. App. 493 (1991), rev'd, 
439 Mich. 650 (1992). 
115 See Civil Rights Brief, supra note 15, passim. 
116 492 U.S. 490, 507-12 (1989). 
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should it ever directly address the "suspect classification" issue in a 
race-based challenge to an abortion funding statute. This section 
will argue that such a challenge will ultimately fail under current 
equal protection jurisprudence, and that this expected failure may 
be fairly attributed to mediating principles in the Court's adminis-
tration of the Equal Protection Clause that are themselves misfor-
mulated and unjust. 
A. De Facto Discrimination 1l7 Under Current Equal Protection Law 
Since 1979, the Supreme Court has consistently held that evi-
dence of a facially neutral governmental act that has a disparate 
negative impact on members of a "suspect class" will not by itself 
subject that act to strict scrutiny, except to the extent that this or 
other "objective" evidence justifies an inference of "discriminatory 
117 The terms de facto and de jure discrimination are sometimes used to describe the 
phenomena I generally refer to herein as "disparate impact" and "discriminatory intent," 
respectively. De jure discrimination usually involves "facial" (that is, codified or overt) classi-
fications by government according to some constitutionally "suspect" criterion, such as race. 
It also extends, however, to classifications that are neutral on their face, but either intended 
to harm members of a "suspect class," see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223, 229 
(1985) (state constitutional provision disenfranchising persons for crimes of "moral turpi-
tude" established for the purpose of attaining "white supremacy"); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 
U.S. 613, 622 (1982) (facially-neutral voting scheme "maintained" for a racially discriminatory 
purpose); White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (voting district gerrymandering scheme 
"used invidiously to cancel out or minimize voting strength" of black residents), or administered 
by the government in a way that renders them functionally equivalent to overt "suspect" 
classifications, see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373 (1886). Historical examples of 
de jure discrimination are laws authorizing the President to designate "zones" for the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, see generally Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and laws by which 
states enforced the racial segregation of their school systems, see Brown v. Board of Educ. 
of Topeka I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). If a particular 
government action discriminates de jure against members of a "suspect class," the burden of 
proof under strict scrutiny shifts to the government to show that such discrimination is not 
"invidious,"-that is, that it is both "necessary to further a compelling government interest" 
and the least restrictive of all means available to attain this interest. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 
at 216. 
De facto discrimination includes, definitionally, all forms of government action that have 
a disadvantaging impact or effect on members of a "suspect class" but that do not involve de 
jure discrimination. Examples of de facto discrimination are provided throughout this section. 
It is definable simply as any government action not discriminatory on its face, in its admin-
istration, or in its purpose, but that nevertheless subjects members of an identifiable group 
to special disadvantage. The degree to which de facto discrimination against a "suspect class" 
will trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is the question explored by this 
section. 
28 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 1 
purpose" on the part of the government. llS In Washington v. Davis ll9 
the Court upheld the District of Columbia Police Department's use 
of a written personnel test in screening applicants to the depart-
ment's officer training program. 120 Plaintiffs were black applicants 
who challenged the screening test on equal protection grounds, 
alleging that the department's use of the test unfairly discriminated 
against black applicants in that these applicants tended to fail the 
test at four times the rate of whites. 121 Moreover, as the District of 
Columbia had never had the test "validated" for its relatedness to 
the job of police officer,122 plaintiffs argued that the presumed 
correlation between an applicant's score and the ability to perform 
on the job was inherently unreliable. 
The Court held that the evidence of disparate racial impact put 
forth by plaintiffs in Davis did not make out a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. 123 Citing 
what it determined to be a "basic equal protection principle that the 
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose,"124 the Court 
held that evidence of the screening test's disparate impact on black 
and white applicants fell short of the showing the Constitution 
required. As the plaintiffs in Davis had produced no evidence tend-
ing to show that the test was designed to fail black applicants at a 
rate higher than whites, they had failed to make out a prima facie 
case of invidious racial discrimination. 
The Court did not commit itself unreservedly to the "basic 
principle" of equal protection law it announced in Davis, however. 
Rather, it held that "disproportionate impact" should not be "irrel-
118 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 
617-18 (1982); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
119 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
12°Id. at 232, 245-46. 
121Id. at 236-37. 
122Id. 
123 Writing for the majority, Justice White noted: 
[W]e have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral quali-
fication for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies "any 
person ... equal protection of the laws" simply because a greater proportion of 
Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups. 
Id. at 245 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, d. 4). 
124Id. at 241 (emphasis added). 
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evant" to the ultimate question of discriminatory purpose,125 and 
that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact ... that 
the law bears more heavily on one race than another."126 It thus 
appeared after Davis that members of a "suspect class" who could 
make a sufficiently strong showing of de facto discrimination might 
still, in some cases, gain the benefit of an inference of "purposeful 
discrimination"-one that would place the burden upon the gov-
ernment to disprove the existence of racial animus. If the depri-
vation to these plaintiffs were found to be severe enough, or cate-
gorical enough, the Davis Court seemed to indicate it would demand 
a "compelling governmental interest" to justify the government's 
prima facie invidious discrimination. 
The possibility of the Court's ever inferring a discriminatory 
purpose from proof of disparate racial impact was sharply curtailed, 
however, in several later decisions purporting to apply the "basic 
principle" announced in Davis. In Personnel Administrator of Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney,127 the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute that 
established an absolute "veteran's preference" in the state's hiring 
and promotion of civil servants. 128 Plaintiff Feeney-a woman and 
nonveteran--challenged the statute as a violation of equal protec-
tion, arguing that the practice of placing all military veterans at the 
top of the list of candidates for available state jobs had the effect of 
favoring male applicants almost exclusively over female appli-
cants. 129 Feeney further argued that the discriminatory impact of 
the Massachusetts statute required the Court to infer an invidiously 
discriminatory purpose on the part of the legislature, as such impact 
was an inevitable result of the legislature's decision to implement 
an absolute veteran's preference. 130 The Court saw no such require-
125Id. at 242. 
126Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added). 
127442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
128Id. at 259. 
129Id. at 270-71. Over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male. Id. Like the 
black police applicants in Davis, who sought to have the screening test invalidated under even 
the "rational basis" standard by arguing that the test had never been validated for its 
relatedness to the job of police officer, Feeney also attempted to challenge the rationality of 
the veterans' preference itself. Because veterans were to be put at the top of all hiring lists 
regardless of their scores on pertinent civil service exams, Feeney argued that the veterans' 
preference did not rationally serve any legitimate objective in hiring civil servants. See id. As 
in Davis, this aspect of Feeney's challenge was dismissed by the Court. 
130Id. at 278. 
30 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1 
ment, however, and it responded to Feeney's challenge by further 
refining its definition of a "discriminatory purpose": 
"Discriminatory purpose" ... implies more than intent as voli-
tion or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the 
decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," 
and not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an iden-
tifiable groUp.131 
Because Feeney presented no evidence tending to show that the 
legislature acted with the specific purpose of disadvantaging female 
civil servants, the Court found she had failed to make out a prima 
facie case of invidious gender-based discrimination. 
While the Feeney Court expressly held that it would not impute 
discriminatory intent to a government entity where that entity's 
actions were merely certain to produce a discriminatory result, the 
Court reiterated in subsequent cases its willingness to infer an invid-
iously discriminatory purpose from "circumstantial," "direct," and 
"objective" evidence. 132 In fact, however, the Court has only deliv-
ered on this promise in the relatively "limited contexts" of jury 
venire selection, district gerrymandering, and, at least historically, 
de facto school segregation. 133 With respect to the selective depriva-
131 [d. (citations omitted). The Court apparently distanced itself from its earlier holding 
in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) with this language. In Palmer, the Court held 
that a city council's decision to close its racially segregated swimming pools in response to a 
court order to integrate was not discriminatory, even if the decision was made "in part 
because of" its racial impact; because operation of the public pools was a discretionary act, 
the city was free to withdraw at the expense of "black and white [citizens] alike." Id. at 224-
25. Further, the Court argued that invidious discrimination should be determined by the 
"actual effect" of a statute on minority groups, since "it is extremely difficult for a court to 
ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative 
enactment." [d. at 224. The Court in Washington v. Davis noted that "[t]o the extent that 
Palmer suggests ... that legislative purpose [as opposed to legislative intent] is irrelevant ... 
our prior cases are to the contrary." 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.ll (1976). But cf Memphis v. 
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 115-16, 119, 128-29 (1981) (city council's closure of white street 
abutting black neighborhood places only "routine burden" on black residents; some evidence 
suggesting that closure decision was racially motivated does not, therefore, mandate a finding 
of discriminatory purpose). 
132 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977). 
133 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987). Even in the area of voter-district 
gerrymandering, Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed that it has only been the "rare case" 
in which the Court has been willing to infer a discriminatory purpose from mere statistical 
disparities. [d. at 293 n.12. When the Court has made such an inference, the Chief Justice 
notes that it has usually found the statistical evidence to warrant a conclusion of discriminatory 
purpose that is "irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical dem-
onstration." [d. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). See Mobile v. 
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tion of other rights, it is consistent with the Court's holdings to 
conclude that statistical evidence of racially disparate impact will not 
give rise to strict scrutiny under equal protection unless such evi-
dence substantially proves that specific government actors acted 
with "discriminatory intent."134 Indeed, outside of the limited con-
texts it has marked for special protection, the Court may be un-
willing to invalidate a discriminatory measure on the part of gov-
ernment even where a plaintiff's evidence of discriminatory animus 
is conclusive. 135 Although such evidence would clearly establish that 
the government has acted "because of" and not merely "in spite 
of" a measure's discriminatory effects, and would thus be sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case, the government may show that it acted 
"because of" many other factors as well, and that anyone of these 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (upholding at-large voting scheme with proven effect of diluting 
black voting strength). But see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (invalidating at-large 
voting scheme based on numerical underrepresentation of minorities, history of voting 
discrimination, history of political unresponsiveness to black community, and effects of past 
discrimination). 
154 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279; Mobile, 446 U.S. at 55; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 
252. Cf Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
The concept of legislative "intent" is not ordinarily interchangeable with that of legislative 
"purpose." A government's "purpose" in passing a particular law is arguably clear from the 
text of the law itself in the legal context in which it was designed to operate. Thus, a law 
erecting impenetrable walls around a black neighborhood would plainly have a discriminatory 
"purpose" even if the government genuinely intended the walls as a monument to the Biblical 
battle of Jericho. While virtually every member of the Court has at one time accepted the 
notion that unconstitutional discrimination requires a racially discriminatory "purpose," some 
Justices, particularly Justices Stevens and White, have strongly urged that this requirement 
should not properly turn on the question of legislative "intent," which, they argue, involves 
the Court in futile scrutiny of "the subjective thought processes" of individual legislators. See 
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (opinion by Justice White); id. at 637 (Stevens,J., 
dissenting); id. at 630 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (opinion 
by Justice Stevens). Nevertheless, a majority of the Court continues to use the terms "purpose" 
and "intent" interchangeably. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("the 
differentiating factor between de jure and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent 
to segregate"). 
155 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. 
Proof that the decision by the [government] was motivated in part by a racially 
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily ... require[] invalidation of the chal-
lenged decision. Such proof would, however, ... shift[] to the [government] the 
burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining 
party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained 
of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. 
[d. (emphasis added). Note that the Court's test in Arlington Heights effectively collapses the 
standard for a prima facie showing of invidious discrimination with "minimum rationality" 
review of the government's purpose in creating a situation of de facto discrimination. Cf 
TRIBE, supra note 31, at 96-99. 
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nondiscriminatory motives-or all of them-would have yielded the 
same result. 136 In such a case, the government's actions will with-
stand an equal protection challenge under current doctrine. 
Thus, in view of its overwhelming reluctance to recognize vio-
lations of equal protection in the absence of de jure discrimination 
(other than in the limited contexts mentioned above), perhaps the 
Court's failure to assess or even to comment upon the racially 
disparate impact of the Missouri statute in Webster was not such a 
surprising omission after all. While it would have been disingenuous 
of the Court not to acknowledge the de jure wealth-based classifi-
cations in the Missouri statute, nothing in the statistical racial dis-
parity or in the text of the statute required, under the Davis line of 
cases, that the restriction's impact on women of color be given 
similar consideration. Indeed, a majority of the modern Court may 
view even the possibility of a successful challenge based upon de 
facto racial discrimination to be substantially foreclosed in most areas 
by its prior holdings. Absent some direct showing of racial animus 
on the part of the Missouri legislature in Webster,137 the facial neu-
trality of the funding restriction in that case made its real-world 
~mp~ct on women of color irrelevant to the Court's equal protection 
mqUIry. 
B. The Antidiscrimination Principle 
Constitutional law commentators have labeled the rule in Davis 
and its progeny-that equal protection only forbids intentional gov-
ernmental discrimination against members of a judicially recognized 
"suspect class"-the "antidiscrimination principle."138 At its base, the 
antidiscrimination principle is animated by two propositions con-
cerning the nature of equal protection under the Constitution-one 
practical and one normative. The practical proposition is that the 
Constitution's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" is a mean-
ingful guarantee-that is, a guarantee that is supposed to mean 
something, even if the words themselves provide little instruction 
1.6 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270. 
m See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (state constitutional provision 
disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude" unconstitutional despite 
facial neutrality; legislators in 1901 were self-proclaimed "white supremacists" and provision 
unchanged since that time). 
I •• See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi-
nation Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976); TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-21; Alan David 
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). 
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as to what that something ought to be. This proposition, in turn, 
has two corollaries: 1) that the judiciary ought to enforce the guar-
antee of equal protection, whatever its meaning, and 2) that there 
ought to be limits on the judiciary's ability to enforce the guarantee 
that are consonant with the role of the judiciary in a democratic 
system. Thus, from a practical standpoint, the antidiscrimination 
principle serves three goals: it supplies a coherent meaning to the 
ambiguous constitutional language, it suggests a principled course 
for judicial language, and it imposes principled limits on the legit-
imacy of that action.!39 
The normative proposition underlying the antidiscrimination 
principle is what ultimately gives the ambiguous constitutional lan-
guage its meaning; it is that the constitution envisions a society in 
which certain group characteristics-race, gender, and ethnicity to 
name a few-are irrelevant to government's distribution of burdens 
and benefits, and that this goal is attainable by the abrogation of 
discriminatory acts perpetrated by discriminatory governmental ac-
tors.!40 The antidiscrimination principle thus reflects a judgment 
that the constitutional language, "no state shall deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"!4! best re-
sembles a prohibition against all (and limited to all) acts of pur-
poseful discrimination by a government against specific judicially-
identified groups within that government's jurisdiction. It also as-
sumes, incidentally, that all forms of constitutionally prohibited dis-
crimination are manifested, on a case-by-case basis, in a discrimi-
natory act perpetrated by a discriminatory actor.!42 Note that there 
is nothing magical or preordained about this interpretation; it is 
merely one possible compromise between the language of the Equal 
Protection Clause, what is known about the history and vision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the practical imperatives dis-
cussed above. A plausible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that leaned more heavily toward ease of administration, or one that 
mandated a more vigorous program of judicial action, might have 
been equally possible.!43 
139 See TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-21, at 1514. 
140 See Freeman, supra note 138, at 1052-57. 
141 U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
142 See Freeman, supra note 138, at 1052-57. 
143 For example, Professor Alan Freeman suggests that the Equal Protection Clause might 
plausibly have been interpreted to mandate a form of judicial review that ensured only the 
procedural integrity of governmental decision making (a "means-oriented" approach), id. at 
1058, or, on the other hand, one that called for more sweeping judicial enforcement of some 
"substantive" level of baseline equality. [d. at 1058-64. 
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Professor Alan Freeman has called this normative proposition 
animating the antidiscrimination principle the "perpetrator per-
spective,"144 as it reflects a vision of reality in which it is sufficient 
to the promise of equal protection for a court to stand vigilantly 
against the "blameworthy perpetrators" of discriminatory acts. As a 
paradigm for addressing de jure and other intentional forms of 
discrimination, the antidiscrimination principle thus provides a 
clear mandate for courts to invalidate official action that is "blame-
worthy" in its "infliction of injury" on protected groups.145 As a 
standard for shielding these groups from exclusively de facto forms 
of discrimination, however, the antidiscrimination principle func-
tions only as a limit on the legitimate exercise of judicial power. 
Because there is neither a "perpetrator" in cases of de facto discrim-
ination nor, indeed, anyone who may be deemed "blameworthy" 
for the adverse treatment of the impacted group, the principle 
detects and counsels no violation of the guarantee of equal protec-
tion. 
1. The Perpetrator Perspective: Its Practical Limitations 
The perpetrator perspective of the antidiscrimination principle 
may be criticized for artificially restricting a court's focus to the 
government actors in each case who have undertaken or maintained 
an ostensibly neutral practice. 146 In Feeney,147 the Court upheld an 
absolute veteran's preference for civil service positions on the 
grounds that the statute before the Court exhibited no evidence of 
purposeful gender-based discrimination. An earlier version of the 
same Massachusetts statute, however, had provided a specific ex-
emption to the veteran's preference for civil service jobs thought to 
"especially call[] for women."148 Such evidence that an earlier Mas-
sachusetts legislature had, in fact, intended the veteran's preference 
to concentrate women in low-paying clerical positions149 might have 
led the Court to conclude that the entire statutory scheme was 
designed in part "because of" and not merely "in spite of" its impact 
on female civil servants. Instead, the Court noted that all overtly 
144 [d. at 1052. 
145 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
146 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979). But see Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222. 
147442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
148 [d. at 266 n.14 (citing 1919 MASS. ACTS c. 150, § 2). 
149 [d. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 
485,488 (1976)). 
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sexist language had since been taken out of the statutory provisions, 
and that the current legislature avowedly maintained the veteran's 
preference for a legitimate and nondiscriminatory purpose-to give 
aid to veterans. 150 That the veteran's preference continued to op-
erate in much the same way as it had before the offending language 
was removed-to the overwhelming detriment of female civil ser-
vants-did not in the Court's opinion make it "purposely discrimi-
natory" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, 
the holding in Feeney is consistent with the idea of a perpetrator 
perspective and also suggests one of the practical limitations of such 
a perspective: if all government officials before a court are "blame-
less" in their maintenance of an historically discriminatory practice, 
there is, strictly, no "perpetrator" to whom a court may attribute a 
violation of the antidiscrimination principle. 151 
The perpetrator perspective may also fail to capture "purpose-
ful" discrimination by government actors whose decisions are be-
yond the Court's capacity to review. In McCleskey v. Kemp,152 a black 
man who had been sentenced to death for shooting a white police 
officer brought an equal protection challenge against the Georgia 
capital punishment statute, claiming that the statute had been ad-
ministered by prosecutors and petit juries in a racially discrimina-
tory manner. 153 McCleskey's challenge was based upon a thorough 
statistical study of death penalty cases in Georgia,154 which found 
that black defendants convicted of killing white victims were 4.3 
times more likely to receive a death sentence in Georgia than white 
defendants convicted of killing black victims,155 and that Georgia 
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of cases involving black 
defendants and white victims but only 15% of the cases involving 
black defendants and black victims. 156 Retrospectively, the study 
concluded that, in cases with aggravating and mitigating factors 
similar to McCleskey's, Georgia juries would not have sentenced to 
150ld. at 266 n.14, 279-80; see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Hunter, 471 
U.S. 222 (1985). 
151 Freeman, supra note 138, at 1053-55. 
152 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
1531d. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially-neutral law may be discrim-
inatory in its administration). 
154 The data generated by the Baldus study of the Georgia capital punishment system 
were based on a 230-variable statistical analysis of over 2,000 murder cases tried in Georgia 
in the 1970s. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87. 
1551d. at 321 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
1561d. at 286-87. 
36 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13: 1 
death 20 of every 34 defendants so sentenced for killing a white 
person if their victim had been black. 157 
Three government actors were implicated by the discriminatory 
impact of the Georgia capital punishment system, anyone of whom 
might have possessed a racially discriminatory intent that would 
have required the invalidation of the Georgia statute: state prose-
cutors, petit juries, or the legislature. With respect to Georgia's 
prosecutors, the Court found that the numerous "policy consider-
ations," traditionally within the prosecutor's authority to evaluate 
in prosecuting a criminal defendant suggested "the impropriety of 
[courts] requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek 
death penalties .... "158 Because the Court therefore lacked the 
authority (or, perhaps, the capacity) to review a prosecutor's com-
plex decision making process, it held that it could not seek to dis-
cover any racial animus in the decision to seek the death penalty. 
Similarly, the Court found that "innumerable factors" neces-
sarily entered into the deliberations of petit juries for which no 
statistical analysis could hope to account,159 and, moreover, that 
"controlling considerations of . . . public policy" required a court 
not to call upon each unique jury "to testify to the motives and 
influences that led to [its] verdict."16o Because jury decisions are, 
like prosecutorial decisions, generally beyond a court's power to 
review, the Court held that it also could not seek to uncover a racially 
discriminatory motive in the decision to impose the death penalty. 
Last, the Court considered the Georgia legislature that had 
adopted the capital sentencing law. Drawing on its earlier decisions 
in Arlington Heights l61 and Feeney,162 the Court observed that the 
statistical evidence in McCleskey's case fell far short of proving that 
the Georgia legislature had adopted or maintained the sentencing 
law "because of" and not merely "in spite of" its discriminatory 
effects. 163 Furthermore, as there were clearly "legitimate reasons" 
for the legislature to have adopted the system of capital punishment 
it did-even if there were also illegitimate reasons l64-the Court 
157Id. at 321 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
158Id. at 296. 
159Id. 
16°Id. (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915); Chicago B. & Q.R. CO. v. 
Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907)). 
161 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
162 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
16' Id. at 298. 
164 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. 
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held that it could not "infer a discriminatory purpose on the part 
of the State of Georgia" based solely on McCleskey's evidence of 
disparate racial impact. 165 In a footnote, the Court commented that 
McCleskey had "introduced no evidence to support [his] claim" that 
the Georgia legislature had acted with a racially discriminatory pur-
pose-a seeming (and perhaps telling) misstatement of the Court's 
own position regarding the evidentiary relevance of de facto discrim-
ination to the issue of purposeful discrimination. 166 
Thus, focusing only on the practical application of the antidis-
crimination principle to cases arising under equal protection, the 
perpetrator perspective might be fairly criticized for failing to rec-
ognize and to invalidate the full range of "purposeful discrimina-
tion" the antidiscrimination principle ostensibly forbids. In partic-
ular, the perpetrator perspective falls short in cases where it is 
acknowledged that purposeful discrimination is at work (because 
no other nonracist or nonsexist explanation is possible), but where 
no "perpetrator" can be identified--either because the blameworthy 
party is not before the court (the Feeney case), or because the court 
is unable to examine the actions of the parties that are before it to 
determine if they are blameworthy (the McCleskey case). In such 
cases, the antidiscrimination principle is violated by its own practical 
limitations, as certain types of discriminatory results that plainly 
could not be effected without purposeful governmental discrimi-
nation escape the operation of the perpetrator perspective. 
2. The Perpetrator Perspective: Its Methodological Limitations 
The Supreme Court in Davis and its progeny held that the 
guarantee of equal protection is only violated by "purposeful" gov-
ernmental discrimination directed against members of a "suspect 
class." Under the perpetrator perspective, however, there is cause 
to question whether all forms of "purposeful" discrimination are 
equally "blameworthy," and therefore whether all are forbidden 
under the Court's definition of a "discriminatory purpose." Con-
sider once more the Court's holdings in Feeney and Arlington Heights. 
In each of these cases, the Court explicitly rejected a reading of 
"purposely discriminatory" that defined a government's "purpose" 
as including the foreseeable and inevitable results of its acts. That 
is, the Court in each of these cases required not merely a discrimi-
165 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 299. 
1661d. at 299 n.21. 
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natory "purpose"-in the broad, arguably ordinary sense of the 
word-nor even a discriminatory "intent"-as this word has also 
been used in the law to encompass the foreseeable results of one's 
acts-but something like a "specific intent" to discriminate against 
a particular group in a particular way. 167 Only acts that are specifically 
motivated by their anticipated adverse impact on members of a pro-
tected group are "purposely discriminatory" under the Court's 
holdings in Feeney and Arlington Heights. 
By definition, the perpetrator perspective asserts that all un-
constitutionally invidious discrimination on the part of the govern-
ment involves discriminatory effects that are, at least to some de-
gree, both consciously anticipated and desired by identifiable 
officials within the government. 168 To put this requirement some-
what differently, the perpetrator perspective assumes that no judi-
cially cognizable violation of the antidiscrimination principle can 
occur in the absence of "blameworthy," subjectively hostile conduct 
by the government. 169 If an official's action has a discriminatory 
impact that is inadvertent, or merely coincidental, then the official 
is presumptively "blameless" of any discriminatory intent and there-
fore not in violation of the antidiscrimination principle. 170 
As Justice Marshall171 and numerous others have observed, 
while blatant and even violent examples of inter-group hostility are 
not rare in the United States, most governmental discrimination, at 
least, no longer takes place, either in its expression or its application, 
at such an overt and detectable level.172 Rather, the type of unjust 
discrimination with which equal protection is generally concerned-
state-sponsored discrimination-seems far more likely to emerge 
today from a range of subtle, even innocent, motives than from the 
kind of "blameworthy" racial animus the intentionality requirement 
167 To the extent the term "specific intent" has a settled meaning in the law, it is a concept 
more familiar to the criminal context. See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 13-
17 (4th ed. 1990); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN j. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS 
PROCESSES 229-31 (5th ed. 1989); JOEL P. BISHOP, BISHOP'S NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 342, 202-
03 (1892). 
168 Freeman, supra note 138, passim. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 1054-55. 
l7l See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 135 (1981) (Marshall, j., dissenting); General 
Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 412 (1982) (Marshall, j., dissenting) (the 
requirement of discriminatory intent in Thirteenth Amendment cases "shuts its eyes to reality, 
ignoring the manner in which racial discrimination most often infects our society"). 
172 See Charles R. Lawrence, The [d, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329-44 (1987). 
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of the perpetrator perspective categorically requires. From a meth-
odological standpoint, therefore, the degree to which the perpetra-
tor perspective should mark the outer bounds of equal protection 
law is called into question by the perspective's inability to capture 
the true range of illegitimate (for example, race or gender) motives 
that may underlie facially-neutral forms of official discrimination. 
Limited by the perpetrator perspective, the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple is incapable of distinguishing disparate treatment originating 
in this range of illegitimate motives from that truly undertaken "in 
spite of" its discriminatory effects. 
3. The Antidiscrimination Principle: Its Constitutional 
Inadequacy 
The practical and methodological failings of the perpetrator 
perspective, and thus of the antidiscrimination principle itself, are 
indicative of an even greater crisis in the principle's constitutional 
underpinnings. By exclusively focusing on "intentional" forms of 
discrimination, I have argued that the perpetrator perspective fre-
quently fails to capture the range of non-merit-based treatment that 
disadvantaged groups may receive at the hands of the government. 
Yet, if it is granted that the Equal Protection Clause and other 
antidiscrimination provisions in the Constitution aspire to a vision 
of society in which the indicia of race, ethnicity and nationality are 
no longer relevant to the government's allocation of burdens and 
benefits, how is the antidiscrimination principle justified in failing 
to address government action that even results in disparate burdens 
according to these indicia? The answer the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple itself gives, by definition, is that the constitution's vision of 
equal protection is fully attainable through the remediation of only 
"intentional" forms of discrimination. 173 Conversely, Professor Free-
man notes, the antidiscrimination principle necessarily asserts that 
all forms of discriminatory treatment that are not the product of 
intentional discrimination must be fully consistent with the Consti-
tution's vision of a "color-blind," or other "indicia-blind" society.174 
173 See supra notes 140-42, 168-70 and accompanying text. 
174 Freeman, supra note 138, at 1066, 1070-71, 1073-76. The antidiscrimination prin-
ciple is obviously not a jurisdictional limitation. Courts have not recused themselves from 
considering evidence of de facto discrimination, but rather, as the Davis cases show, have 
continued to invite evidence of disparate impact on protected groups as a part of the larger 
inquiry into discriminatory purpose. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. More-
over, in certain limited contexts, the Supreme Court has continued to recognize evidence of 
disparate impact as potentially dispositive of the question whether strict scrutiny should 
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Freeman thus perceives in the antidiscrimination principle a 
"refined abstraction" regarding the nature of contemporary soci-
ety.175 If the goal of antidiscrimination provisions in the Constitution 
is to attain a "future society" in which all disparities in the treatment 
of designated groups are fully attributable to "accidental, impartial, 
or neutral phenomena utterly disassociated from any [discrimina-
tory] practice," 176 then any principle of equal protection law "that 
legitimizes as nondiscriminatory substantial disproportionate bur-
dens borne by one [such group] is effectively claiming that its dis-
tributional rules are already the ones that would exist in future soci-
ety."177 That is, the antidiscrimination principle does not serve 
merely to abdicate judicial authority over the question whether 
specific instances of de facto discrimination are inconsistent with the 
vision of an "indicia-blind society."178 Rather, the principle can only 
be justified as incorporating the whole of the promise of equal pro-
tection if it actively "legitimizes" de facto forms of governmental 
discrimination as consistent with the ideals of meritocracy and 
group equality. 
At the base, then, of its practical and methodological failings, 
the antidiscrimination principle reflects a view of society that is 
essentially abstract and, in its abstraction, inconsistent with the con-
stitutional promise of equal protection. If the "future society" of 
group irrelevance has arrived, then courts truly need do no more 
apply. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Thus, it seems, the function of the anti-
discrimination principle in ordinary cases of de facto discrimination has not been merely to 
render these claims non justiciable, but to require courts actively to pass on the question 
whether the disparate impact complained of is or is not the product of governmental dis-
crimination. Freeman argues that by ruling disparate statutory burdens on protected groups 
"nondiscriminatory" despite their discriminatory impact, the antidiscrimination principle does 
not restrain judicial authority so much as it merely redirects this authority toward the 
constitutional "legitimization" of unintentional governmental discrimination. Freeman, supra 
note 138, passim. 
As Professor Tribe suggests, the Court is not bound to place its imprimatur upon 
measures that merely lack discriminatory intent or that, in any event, the Court feels it lacks 
the authority to remedy sufficiently. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-20, at 1512. Rather, by 
acknowledging that a form of discrimination is being effected by a particular measure, but 
that the Court is unable or unwilling in certain circumstances to provide an appropriate 
remedy, Tribe argues that the Court could more responsibly exercise whatever degree of 
deference it chooses without incidentally-and often conclusively-announcing to all agencies 
of government that a particular practice gives no offense to constitutional notions of equality. 
Id. 
175 Freeman, supra note 138, at 1066. 
176Id. at 1075. 
177Id. (emphasis added). 
178 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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than to guard against intentional deviations from this happy norm. 
If, however, such a society is still far from realization, and individ-
uals continue to be locked out of institutions of political and eco-
nomic power based in whole or in part upon their membership in 
an historically oppressed group, then the unattained constitutional 
vision of a "future society" requires courts to be more attentive to 
the range of unmeritorious treatment such groups actually receive. 
By tailoring equal protection law to the abstract possibility of a 
"future society," the Supreme Court has instead fashioned a doc-
trine unresponsive both to the realities of invidious discrimination 
and to the unrealized goal of meritocracy. 
The antidiscrimination principle's function as a "legitimizing" 
doctrine is, however, far more insidious than this objection indicates. 
By actively classifying all unintentional forms of discrimination as 
"nondiscriminatory," the perpetrator perspective further invites the 
conclusion that all such de facto discriminatory effects must fairly be 
attributable to "accidental" or "neutral phenomena" in the real 
world. 179 That is, the antidiscrimination principle necessarily implies 
that persons or groups who suffer special burdens under "nondis-
criminatory" practices have themselves created the conditions under 
which they are disadvantaged. For the antidiscrimination principle 
to comport with the animating equal protection ideal of meritocracy, 
such unsubtle "victim blame" is absolutely required by the Davis line 
of cases: black applicants to a police officer training program must 
be less qualified than the white applicants who are admitted, black 
criminal defendants who are sentenced to death must commit more 
vicious and heinous murders than the white defendants who are 
spared, women stuck in low-paying clerical jobs must be more par-
ticularly suited to them than the men who advance, and Medicaid-
dependent women of color who are unable to obtain abortions must 
be less industrious or less deserving than the women who can afford 
them. 
If equal protection law is to be lifted out of this harsh and 
unproductive abstraction, courts must restore their foundational 
concept of "discrimination" of its descriptive content in the real 
world human context. The Constitution itself establishes a frame-
work for democracy and capitalism that is virtually defined by its 
realism in the relationships of citizens to each other-both the 
strengths and the self-interested shortcomings that invariably char-
179 Freeman, supra note 144, at 1075. 
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acterize these relationships. For equal protection to serve as a prac-
tical corrective in the real world of human interaction, it is essential 
that the Court similarly reestablish the doctrine in the evolving 
relationships of power and domination that realistically threaten the 
constitutional vision. 
The antidiscrimination principle is a step in that direction, but 
it is drastically incomplete. By focusing on the perpetrator of a 
discriminatory act, the antidiscrimination principle artificially limits 
itself to only one-half of the discriminatory relationship in which 
the ideal of meritocracy is subverted. Clearly, every act of discrim-
ination must have a perpetrator-though many may be long dead, 
judicially inaccessible, or "blameless" in their apparent motivations. 
Equally true, however, is that every act of discrimination must have 
a victim: a person or group who serves in an immediate sense as a 
repository of discriminatory intent even when no "blameworthy 
perpetrator" is apparent. Without encompassing both parties to a 
discriminatory act, "discrimination" itself has become a jurispru-
dential concept in which only the victims are to blame for their 
"unintended" subjugation. Only by redefining "discrimination" to 
realistically encompass both attendees to a discriminatory act can 
equal protection law plausibly be wrested from this doctrinal arti-
ficiality and redirected toward relationships of discrimination that 
practically threaten the constitutional vision. The remainder of this 
analysis will explore a neglected principle of equal protection law 
that might restore to the doctrine this critically substantive content. 
V. THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION UNDER THE ANTISUBJUGATION 
PRINCIPLE 
In Washington v. Davis,180 the Supreme Court purported to 
identify a "basic principle" of constitutional equal protection, that 
"the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."181 
As this basic principle has been interpreted and applied in cases 
following Davis, however, it neglects what was once a prominent 
theme in the Court's administration of the Equal Protection Clause 
and other antidiscrimination provisions of the Constitution. In cases 
decided under this forgotten doctrine, the Court was occasionally 
justified in going beyond the search for a "blameworthy perpetra-
180 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
181 [d. at 240. 
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tor" to strike down measures that in themselves perpetuated the 
subjugation of a protected group.182 The resuscitation of this 
theme-labelled the "antisubjugation principle" by Professor Laur-
ence Tribe183-is part of my proposal for retrieving equal protection 
law from the artificial confines of the antidiscrimination principle. 
A. The Transition from Plessy to Brown I 
Nearly forty years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education 1,184 the 
Supreme Court held that a state's maintenance of racially-segre-
gated public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guar-
antee of "equal protection of the laws,"185 thus signalling the begin-
ning of the end for lawful racial segregation in the United States. 
For forty years before Brown I, the Court had clung to the doctrine 
of "separate but equal" it had contrived in Plessy v. Ferguson. 186 
Under that doctrine, states were permitted to force black children 
and white children into separate schools, so long as the schools 
provided for black children were, very roughly, "equal" in quality 
to those designated for whites. Brown I put an end to this practice 
in 1954, and paved the way in future cases for the piecemeal dis-
mantling of the United States system of racial apartheid. 187 
Although Brown I was, of course, a case involving quite delib-
erate, de jure racial segregation, the Court had held for forty years 
under Plessy that government-sponsored segregation was not by 
182 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 
U.S. 1 (1971); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); see also Freeman, supra 
note 138, at 1079-1102. 
183 See TRIBE supra note 17, § 16-21. Other commentators have developed analagous 
approaches under a variety of different names. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,147-70 (1976) ("group-disadvantaging principle"); 
Freeman, supra note 138, passim ("substantive equal protection" incorporating "victim per-
spective"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) ("equal citizenship"). Although I use 
the term "antisubjugation principle" throughout this analysis, my concept of the principle-
its scope and methodology-is not identical to Professor Tribe's. In this article, I have 
attempted to formalize the judicial inquiry Tribe suggests by fleshing out many of the 
considerations he has raised and incorporating them into what I hope is a workable and 
coherent proposal for judicial administration of the Equal Protection Clause. Except where 
I have specifically cited Tribe, any presuppositions or characteristics attributed to the anti-
subjugation principle, and any errors in the analysis or application of the principle, are my 
own. 
184 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
185 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
186 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
187 See id. at 540,547,551. 
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itself a form of invidious racial "discrimination": 188 so long as legally 
segregated programs or facilities gave "equal" treatment to mem-
bers of "nonwhite" races, the mere purposeful classification of in-
dividuals by race was irrelevant to the doctrine of equal protection 
under Plessy.189 Chief Justice Warren's unanimous opinion in Brown 
I thus made no mention of the motives or purposes underlying 
Kansas' school segregation plan, but rather focused entirely on the 
"effect of segregation itself on [the] public education" of black 
children. 19o Observing in this regard that "[s]egregation ... has a 
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of 
negro children," the Court ultimately concluded that it could no 
longer rationally maintain the doctrine of "separate but equal" in 
the area of public education. 191 
Apart from the Court's consideration of the actual effects of 
segregation on black schoolchildren, there is no visible legal basis 
in the Brown I opinion for the Court's abandonment of the regime 
of de jure segregation it had sanctioned in Plessy. First, no factual 
evidence exists that the legislatures in Plessy and Brown I had ap-
preciably different motives for establishing their respective systems 
of racial segregation-nor, as I have said, did the Court in Brown I 
concern itself with such differences. Second, the shift in doctrine 
between Plessy and Brown I cannot be explained by reference to the 
rights deprived to persons of color under each type of statutory 
regime. Nothing in the Brown I opinion suggests that the right to a 
quality education was found to be of constitutionally greater signif-
icance than the right to travel by one's chosen railway carriage. 
Indeed, the Court in subsequent cases has consistently held that 
Brown I did not establish a "fundamental right" to education 192_ 
and certainly not a right to an education of any particular quality.193 
Rather, the crucial shift in the Court's reasoning between Plessy and 
Brown I seems only to have been its willingness in the latter case to 
include the discriminatory effects of segregation on "nonwhite" 
schoolchildren among its other doctrinally established indicia of 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
188 See id. at 543-44. 
189 See id. at 548. 
190 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka 1,347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
191 Id. at 494, 495. 
192 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28-39 (1973). 
19S Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37. 
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In Plessy, the Court accused the black plaintiffs of having "put 
[a] construction upon" the practice of segregation that characterized 
it as "stamp[ing] the colored race with a badge of inferiority."194 
Reasoning that nothing in the language of the statute suggested 
that its purpose was to oppress or demean black citizens,195 the 
Plessy Court found that, to the contrary, a law segregating railroad 
carriages was a "reasonable" exercise of the state's power, "enacted 
in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the 
annoyance or oppression of a particular class."196 The Court thus 
held that segregation laws did not "necessarily imply the inferiority 
of either race to the other."197 "The underlying fallacy of the plain-
tiffs' argument," the Court concluded, lay in its "assumption" that 
racial segregation, without the further intent to demean or oppress, 
was a purposeful form of discrimination against them. 198 
By contrast, although the language of the statute at issue in 
Brown I was at least as facially inoffensive as that in Plessy,199 the 
Court itself was willing to adopt the perspective of the plaintiffs in 
order to balance the state's presumptively "legitimate" interest in 
maintaining segregated schools with the actual impact of segregation 
on the quality of education available to black children.20o By allowing 
itself to view segregated public education in the broad, historically 
realistic context of racial oppression, the Court was disposed to note 
an apparent contradiction between the reality of segregated learn-
ing and the abstract legal possibility of "separate but equal" edu-
cation.201 Only by grounding antidiscrimination law in the reality of 
racial inequality-in discrimination as black children themselves ex-
perienced it-was the Court finally able in Brown I to raise the 
inherent inequality of segregated education to a constitutional level 
of significance. Viewing the forty-year-old doctrine of de jure seg-
regation in this way, the Court naturally concluded that its holding 
194 Plessy, 163 u.s. at 551. 
195Id. 
196 Id. at 550 (emphasis added). "The distinction between laws interfering with the 
political equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two races in schools, 
theaters, and railway carriages has been frequently drawn by this Court." Id. at 545. 
197Id. at 551. 
198 Id. 
199 Compare id. at 540-41 (quoting 1890 La. Acts 111) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1724 
(1949). 
200 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka I, 347 u.s. 483,492-93 (1954). 
20IId. at 495. 
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in Plessy should yield in the context of public education to the 
constitutional ideals of "equality of opportunity" and meritocracy. 202 
Brown 1, however, cannot accurately be understood to hold that 
discriminatory impact alone is sufficient to render a challenged 
statute unconstitutional, even in the limited context of public edu-
cation. In later cases, the Court held that states having undertaken 
and completed good faith measures to integrate their systems of 
education could not subsequently be found in violation of Brown 1 
if "white flight" or other demographic shifts resulted in the de facto 
re-segregation of their schools.203 Assuming these later cases are, as 
the Court maintains, consistent with the holding in Brown 1, the 
Brown 1 Court itself presumptively would not have found the mere 
fact of a segregated public school system constitutionally intolerable 
if this segregation had been caused by purely neutral (that is, un-
intended or accidental) phenomena. Had such been the case, the 
Court would have been obliged to reach the same conclusion even 
if unintentional school segregation had created disparities in the 
quality of education identical to those the Court identified in Brown 
1.204 
Assuming, however, that the state legislatures in Brown 1 and 
Plessy shared a substantially similar objective-to create specific ra-
cially segregated environments-it is also fairly clear that the mere 
intent of the legislature in Brown I was, standing alone, insufficient 
to justify the Court's departure from its holding in Plessy. As I have 
already noted, the Court in Plessy-and for forty years after 
Plessy205-had specifically held de jure segregation not to be a form 
of invidious racial "discrimination" prohibited by the Constitution, 
as the mere intent to segregate was thought not to be an intent to 
"annoy" or "oppress" any "particular class."206 As Brown I explicitly 
left this earlier holding undisturbed except in the narrow context 
202 See id. at 493. 
208 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1976); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1,31-32 (1971); see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 
443 U.S. 449, 458-64 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 747 n.22 (1974); Keyes v. 
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,208 (1973); Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 464-65 (1972). 
204 Cf San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1 (1973) (children in an 
overwhelmingly Hispanic school district do not have right to an education of equal quality 
to that provided in more affluent districts). 
205 See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 
(1899). 
206 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
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of school segregation,207 the Court presumably must have identified 
in school segregation some form of discriminatory intent in school 
segregation that went beyond the mere intent to segregate in Plessy. 
Arguably, the Court in Brown I not only recognized the Kansas 
legislature's clear intent to racially segregate its schools, but further 
inferred an intent on the part of the state to educate its black students 
in a manner inferior to white students.208 Such an intent would have 
made the Kansas school system not merely a "nondiscriminatory" 
separation of the races, but a transparently deliberate mechanism 
for "interfering with the political equality of the negro,"209 a dis-
criminatory purpose prohibited even under the original holding in 
Plessy.210 Although a state's provision of substandard education to 
black children would seem not to violate the Constitution were it 
the result of purely neutral phenomena,211 the Court in Brown I 
may have quite naturally concluded that the Kansas legislature in-
tended the foreseeable consequences of maintaining racially segre-
gated schools on the quality of education provided to black children. 
Certainly, it would have been no great leap for the Court to have 
concluded that the legislature was at least indifferent to the impact 
of its actions on black children. But where a government's indiffer-
ence to the deprivation of a particular interest so closely mirrors a 
tradition of intentionally depriving that interest for the purpose of 
subjugating a disadvantaged group, the Court may have recognized 
the legitimacy of treating the government's indifference to the fore-
seeable consequences of its actions as, in every respect, an intent to 
see those consequences effected. 
207 See Brown [, 347 U.S. at 495. The factual finding that segregated public education 
had a negative impact on black children that went beyond the mere separation of the races 
was, in fact, the only area in which the Brown [ Court explicitly rejected the holding in Plessy. 
[d. at 494-95. Once the Court had concluded, based on "modern authority" in the field of 
psychology, id. at 494 n.ll, that "separate educational facilities [were] inherently unequal," 
no further deviation from Plessy was necessary to find the Kansas school system invalid on 
equal protection grounds. [d. at 495. 
208 See id. at 494. 
209 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545. Brown [ drew the connection between equal educational 
opportunity and the democratic ideal of equal political participation explicitly: "Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship." 347 U.S. at 493. 
210 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-35 (1950) (segregation of law school uncon-
stitutional under Plessy); McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641-42 (segregation of graduate program 
unconstitutional under Plessy). 
211 See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Antisubjugation Principle: Balancing the "Victim" and 
"Perpetrator" Perspectives 
The transition from Plessy to Brown I illustrates two important 
aspects of what Professor Tribe has labelled the "antisubjugation 
principle."212 First, unlike a court functioning today under the an-
tidiscrimination principle, the Court in Brown I was able to engineer 
a principled departure from "separate but equal" by considering 
both the specific objectives of the Kansas legislature in classifying 
schoolchildren by race and the real-world impact of this classification 
on black schoolchildren forced to attend segregated schools.213 Sec-
ond, after concluding that segregated public schools had an adverse 
impact on the education of black schoolchildren, the Court in Brown 
I was able to raise this disparity to a level of constitutional signifi-
cance by realistically viewing Kansas' provision of substandard ed-
ucation to blacks as tantamount to a purposeful "interfer[ ence] with 
the political equality of the negro."214 Each of these aspects of the 
Court's opinion in Brown I shed light on the neglected, animating 
presumptions of the antisubjugation principle. 
The antisubjugation principle focuses on the persons actually 
disadvantaged by, as well as the perpetrator of, an allegedly discrim-
inatory governmental act. This methodological focus on the subjects 
of disparate treatment by government has been characterized, per-
haps unfortunately, as the "victim perspective" by Professor Alan 
Freeman.215 On a jurisprudential level, the "victim perspective" of 
212 TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-21. 
213 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492 n.9, 493-94. 
214 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
215 Freeman, supra note 138, at 1053 n.16. To some extent, each component of the term, 
"victim perspective," invites misunderstanding as to what the term is supposed to describe. 
I have retained it here, however, for two reasons. First, "victim perspective" is the term 
Professor Freeman has chosen, and I can detect no significant deviation in my understanding 
and use of his concept that would justify giving it another name. Second, even if I were 
disposed to distance myself in some way from Freeman's formulation, I doubt whether I 
could coin a more descriptive term that would not pay a hefty price in laconicism ("disad-
vantaged group perspective" only solves half the problem, and is already three times as long). 
"Victim" is a value-laden term, perhaps more so than "perpetrator," and unfortunately 
connotes a condition of helplessness, a moral posture of innocence, and, ironically, a "blame-
worthy perpetrator." None of these connotations is intended here. In using the word "victim," 
I mean only to describe persons who are specifically adversely affected by an allegedly 
discriminatory governmental action, not to rule in advance on whether that adverse impact 
is, in fact, discriminatory. 
There is also an important distinction to be made here between the word "perspective," 
and the often-synonymous word "perception." It is not likely that a court would derive any 
benefit from considering or balancing the victim's perception of a governmental action, because 
such a standard would likely be as subjective and malleable as the antidiscrimination principle 
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the antisubjugation principle requires a court to consider one broad 
component of de facto discrimination that it is predisposed to neglect 
under the antidiscrimination principle: the effects of an ostensibly 
neutral government action on an historically subjugated group, not 
only the statistical impact of such action, but whether it exacerbates 
or perpetuates pre-existing stigma that are historically associated with 
a pattern of hostility or indifference toward the subjugation of that 
group.216 
The "victim perspective" is not in the nature of a "test" of the 
validity of government action, however, but rather a range of ad-
ditional criteria that might be used to broaden the existing equal 
protection inquiry beyond the motivation of a particular govern-
ment actor in a particular case. The normative presumption of the 
antisubjugation principle is, in this respect, that courts should not 
permit government to effect through inadvertence, coincidence, or 
covert animus that which it could not accomplish openly and "in-
tentionally."217 The "victim perspective" merely asserts that the real-
world impact of a measure claimed to violate equal protection is a 
legitimate starting place for this inquiry. 
The antisubjugation principle, however, would not abandon 
intent as a crucial element of discrimination. Insofar as intent to do 
harm to members of a "suspect class" may realistically take the form 
of ignorance, indifference, or subconscious hostility toward the 
needs of a disempowered group,218 the antisubjugation principle 
would appropriately take a more sophisticated view of "discrimi-
natory intent" than the Court's holdings currently allow. Further-
more, insofar as intent to discriminate may only be visible over the 
historical lifetime of a particular governmental practice,219 the an-
tisubjugation principle would require the Court to find certain dis-
criminatory practices unconstitutional in themselves, even where be-
is abstract and rigid. The "perception" a person has of the deprivations placed on her by 
her government may be, of course, that they are unjustifiable under any set of circumstances, 
no matter what other societal objectives they may serve. The word "perspective" is intended 
to imply only a consideration of the impact of a statute on the class of persons that a statute 
disproportionately burdens, not the actual "perception" of those burdens by the parties 
before the court. A principle of equal protection that focused on the victim's "perception" 
of a discriminatory practice would, moreover, only duplicate the problems created by the 
Court's focus on the subjective thought-processes of public officials. See supra notes 170-72 
and accompanying text. 
216 See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 1520. 
217 [d. at 1519-20. 
218 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text. 
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mgn justifications have replaced or merely masked the 
government's originally invidious motives. While the antisubjuga-
tion principle thus takes a somewhat broader and more realistic 
view of "intent" than the Court's holdings after Davis, the idea of 
"purposeful discrimination" would still be an essential element of a 
claim of unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Of course, were the antisubjugation principle to require that 
"purposeful discrimination" be proven by direct evidence of a par-
ticular government actor's invidious state of mind-which may be 
the only way to know for certain whether subconscious or barely-
conscious factors underlie a particular practice-nothing would dis-
tinguish it from the status quo under Davis and its progeny. Rather, 
the antisubjugation principle offers a methodology, a jurispruden-
tial paradigm of sorts, for the drawing of a conclusive inference of 
purposeful discrimination based solely on objective and circumstan-
tial evidence in certain cases of de facto discrimination.220 As applied, 
the jurisprudential paradigm of the antisubjugation principle would 
involve a two-part test, each step of which is designed to limit the 
inference of a discriminatory purpose to those cases in which the 
constitutional vision of equal protection-of a society based on in-
dividual achievement and merit-is realistically placed in jeopardy. 
The first step of a court's inquiry under the antisubjugation 
principle is to confront the question courts dispose of only inciden-
tally under the antidiscrimination principle-namely, whether the 
disparity in treatment raised by members of a "suspect class" is 
more likely attributable to accidental or neutral phenomena in the 
real world than to some manifestation of the specific historical 
oppression of that class.221 For example, if a court concluded, based 
on the evidence before it, that Catholic parents in the United States 
were more likely than other parents to have more than four children 
during their lifetimes, and that Catholic families were therefore 
likely to suffer more acutely under a new federal tax law repealing 
220 By a "conclusive inference," I do not mean to imply that the constitutionality of any 
measure might turn on merely whether it imposes a disparate burden on a particular group. 
Rather, such an inference would be "conclusive" only in that the antisubjugation principle, 
when triggered, would demand strict scrutiny of a government's prima facie invidious classi-
fication. If a government offered affirmative evidence that it acted for some other, nondis-
criminatory reason in imposing the disparate burdens complained of, such evidence would 
go toward the government's showing of a "compelling governmental interest" justifying its 
mistreatment of a specific protected group. 
221 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. See also Freeman, supra note 138, at 1075. 
1993] ABORTION FUNDING RESTRICTIONS 51 
the deduction for dependent children,222 the court would be obliged 
to determine under the antisubjugation principle whether the long 
history of anti-Catholic bias in the United States or some accidental, 
neutral phenomenon was a more likely explanation for the law's 
disparate impact on Catholics. Looking at history, at the nature and 
impact of anti-Catholic bias on Catholic families, and at the range 
of factors that might lead Catholic parents to have more children 
than other parents in the United States, the court might well con-
clude that neutral phenomena, such as the informed decisions of 
some Catholic parents to have more than four children, more ad-
equately explained the law's disparate impact than the historical 
subjugation of Catholics as a class.223 
In a case such as Washington v. Davis,224 however, where black 
applicants to a police officer training program tended to fail the 
program's entrance exam at four times the rate ofwhites,225 a court's 
calculus under the antisubjugation principle might be very differ-
ent. The court would consider the history of black oppression in 
the United States, the nature and impact of that oppression on 
black persons, and the range of factors that might lead black ap-
plicants to a police officer training program to score lower on an 
entrance exam than their white counterparts. If the court were then 
to conclude that some indeterminate aspect of black subjugation in 
the United States more adequately explained the performance of 
these black applicants than their inherent or chosen baseness, stu-
pidity, laziness, or mere inability to perform in the job of police 
officer, the court would immediately progress to the second level of 
inquiry under the antisubjugation principle. 
As part of its inquiry under the "victim perspective," a court is 
next obliged to consider the nature of the interest effectively limited 
by the government's action, and the extent to which that interest is 
itself connected with a "tradition of hostility toward an historically 
subjugated group, or a pattern of blindness or indifference to the 
interests of that groUp."226 As focusing on the victim of a discrimi-
222 The hypothetical is wholly fictitious. 
223 This is not to say that such a law would withstand other types of constitutional 
challenges; perhaps it would not. Under both the antisubjugation principle and the antidis-
crimination principle, however, a court would not, in all likelihood, find the suggested tax 
law to discriminate unconstitutionally against Catholic families. 
224 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
225/d. at 236-37. 
226 TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-21, at 1520. In this way, the antisubjugation principle 
might be expected to bring a substantive component to equal protection law that would, as 
Tribe suggests, strengthen the existing similarities between the "fundamental rights" doctrine 
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natory act necessarily entails an inquiry into the extent and nature 
of the interests deprived by a governmental practice, note that, at 
this second level, the antisubjugation principle implicitly asserts that 
certain types of interests, when they are deprived or partially de-
prived to certain protected groups, more naturally give rise to an 
inference of discriminatory intent than others. The basis for such 
an assumption cannot go unexamined. After all, one of the strong-
est arguments in favor of the antidiscrimination principle is that it 
provides a bright-line rule for distinguishing incidental disparities 
in the administration of neutral rules-which may exist even in a 
future, harmonious society-from invidious governmental discrim-
ination.227 Without a standard for distinguishing which types of 
interests, and which types of protected groups, strengthen the in-
ference of discriminatory purpose under the antisubjugation prin-
ciple, this second level of inquiry seems to invite unprincipled ju-
dicial activism in the name of equal protection.228 
Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested such a differentiating 
principle. Tribe argues that there are certain constitutional inter-
ests, a subclass of interests he refers to as "relational rights,"229 that 
under the Equal Protection Clause and the more familiar doctrine of substantive due process. 
Id. § 16-21, at 1517 n.26. These two substantive doctrines would not be identical, however; 
the Equal Protection Clause would presumptively continue to protect certain interests that 
are uniquely within its sphere of historical concern. Rather, a doctrine of equal protection 
administered through the antisubjugation principle would tend independently to protect 
only those interests that govern the inherent power relationships between individuals and 
groups in a democratic system. [d. § 16-21, at 1520; see infra notes 229-31 and accompanying 
text. 
227 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
228 If indeed, as Justice Holmes sneered in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), appeals to 
equal protection are "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments," id. at 208, there is 
even greater reason to be concerned about the legitimate scope of judicial action under the 
antisubjugation principle. 
229 Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative 
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REV. 330, 331-33 (1985). In his analysis, 
Tribe draws a distinction between "relational" rights and "individual" rights. Individual rights 
are those which citizens can exercise on their own, and which they are free to waive, by 
contract or otherwise, if they should decide that greater benefit would result from this waiver. 
See id. at 334. Individual rights are also those that are "negative" in character-they give rise 
to an "individual veto" over any governmental action that would limit them unjustifiably. Id. 
at 333. Most constitutional rights, Tribe argues, are of this "individual-alienable-negative" 
type.Id. at 332. The Constitution guarantees an individual's rights to speak freely or to "bear 
arms," for example, but these rights are also freely alienable by the individual, in the 
marketplace or elsewhere, if she should choose not to exercise them. Correlatively, govern-
ment is under no obligation to assist the individual in the exercise of these rights. See id. at 
334. Although the government may not impinge upon the individual's right to free speech 
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by their nature are designed as specific constitutional responses to 
known forms of discrimination against certain historically disadvan-
taged groups.230 Relational rights of this type-such as the Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery-have been recognized 
or created at various points in history to remedy specifically those 
forms of discrimination that tend to undermine the equality of 
political and economic opportunity guaranteed to all groups in a 
democracy.23! Where the immutable characteristics of a certain 
or to bear arms, neither is it required to guarantee the individual a forum, a megaphone, or 
a gun if the market does not otherwise provide one. 
Unlike individual rights, relational rights are not waivable by the individual because it is 
not the individual whom these rights are primarily designed to protect. [d. at 333. Democratic 
society, rather, is the chief beneficiary of relational rights, as these rights ensure the threshold 
levels of equality and community that such a society requires. [d. at 333-34. Equal access, 
for example, is a relational right governing the relationship between the government and 
the governed in a democracy-it is thus a right that neither the government nor the governed 
may alienate by law or by contract. [d. at 334. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 535, 568 (1964) 
(right to vote "an essential part of the concept of a government of laws and not men") (quoted 
in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966)). Similarly, rights establishing 
the minimum access a defendant must have to the criminal justice system are relational rights. 
As the Court held in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), "equal protection and due process 
emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, 
so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American 
court .... '" [d. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). 
Tribe argues that all relational rights that the individual needs assistance to exercise 
necessarily give rise to an affirmative duty on the part of government to remove these rights 
from regulation by the marketplace-that is, .to ensure their availability to all persons on 
more or less equal terms. Tribe, supra, at 335. He gives the Thirteenth Amendment's 
prohibition of slavery as an example, noting that the government could not honor that 
command by saying that "the slave who needs affirmative help to purchase his manumission, 
or to destroy the physical chains by which he is still bound, must simply buy his freedom, 
and the equipment needed to secure it .... " [d. at 335. In Tribe's analysis, relational rights 
for which either the government or the market are prerequisite necessarily must be "positive" 
rights. But cf Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 n.5, 471 n.6, 474 n.8 (1977) (government 
only has obligation to ensure availability of rights over which government holds a "monop-
oly"). "Negative" rights that the market regulates might therefore be understood, roughly, 
as "commodities." A citizen's right to own a gun, for example, or to acquire more than the 
minimally-guaranteed level of education, are essentially rights to behave in the consumer 
market in certain ways-to buy a gun or to pay for a particular college degree. The "right" 
itself is not jeopardized by this market regulation; rather, it retains its character as an 
unexercised "right to buy," "lease," or "own." By contrast, relational rights, were they to be 
alienable by the market or by an act of government, would be stripped entirely of their 
character as "rights." That is, it would be senseless to speak of a general "right" not to be 
enslaved if one had to purchase one's manumission, or of a "right" to vote if it were 
understood that only monied individuals could cast ballots. Relational rights, when they are 
reduced to commodities, do not therefore become "negative" rights. Rather, they become, 
for lack of a better word, "non-rights." 
230 See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 1517-18. 
231 See Tribe, supra note 229, at 333 n.l4. The purpose of these rights, from the per-
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group have triggered arbitrary barriers to that group's access to the 
institutions of the political and economic marketplace, constitutional 
ideals of meritocracy and equality of opportunity have required the 
establishment of specific relational rights to guard against the pos-
sibility of state-sanctioned and state-sponsored oppression. Having 
as their goal the preservation of the democratic and capitalist sys-
tem,232 these relational rights preserve the legitimacy of a society 
whose distributional rules purport to be based solely on the effort 
and skill of its individual members. 
Relational rights analysis suggests that there are certain types 
of cases in which it is particularly appropriate to impute a discrim-
inatory purpose to a governmental actor who too casually dismisses 
the discriminatory effects of his otherwise legitimate official actions. 
If the Constitution suggests a causal link between the very existence 
of certain rights and official discrimination against certain histori-
cally disadvantaged groups, then courts should seemingly take the 
selective deprivation of such rights to the groups they specifically 
protect as sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose. Particularly 
where this type of deprivation results from mere indifference on 
the part of government toward the needs of a disadvantaged group, 
the existence of a specific antidiscrimination right in the Constitu-
tion would seem to belie any meaningful distinction between this 
type of motivation and more "intentional" subjugation of the af-
fected group. 
spective of a democratic system, is to enable the groups they specifically target to overcome 
whatever historically "given" characteristics have impeded their access to the political and 
economic marketplace. Normatively, relational rights of this type seek to mediate the power 
relationships in a democracy that, because of their tendency to disadvantage arbitrarily 
particular groups, work against the ideals of an open political system and a free market 
enshrined in the Constitution. 
Without attempting to guarantee "equality of condition" among citizens, all relational 
rights serve to establish the minimally requisite "equality of opportunity" or "equality of 
access" that democratic marketplaces presuppose. Id. at 335-40; cf Michelman, supra note 
Ill, passim; Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). As noted in the text, the Civil 
War Amendments, which abolished de jure institutions of slavery, removed the most onerous 
impediment that history had placed on the access of blacks to political and economic equality. 
Prior to the framing of the Constitution, other limitations based on "immutable" group 
characteristics had prompted the creation of similar relational rights. Article 1, Section 9 
guaranteed that persons of "common" ancestry would no longer be subrogated to nobles in 
their access to institutions of government and commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Article 
VI, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and the Establishment Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I, ensured 
that persons of all historically stigmatized faiths would have equal access to political power. 
232 Tribe, supra note 229, at 333. 
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Of course, whether or not a court should draw an inference of 
discriminatory purpose from a showing of only de facto discrimi-
nation cannot turn on whether a "relational" right is at stake, as 
this category simply does not exist outside Professor Tribe's analyt-
ical framework. Rather, relational rights analysis merely suggests 
that there are substantive areas where a court's sensitivity to more 
subtle forms of official discrimination would be particularly called 
for under the antisubjugation principle. To recall the specific judi-
cial inquiry mandated by the "victim perspective," an inference of 
discriminatory purpose would become increasingly more likely un-
der the antisubjugation principle as the de facto deprivation visited 
on an historically disempowered group comes closer to affecting 
substantive interests that are themselves associated with the protection 
of that group from a "tradition of hostility," "blindness," or "indif-
ference" by government.233 Crucial to a court's application of the 
antisubjugation principle are, therefore: a realistic understanding 
of the power relationships involved in a particular instance of dis-
criminatory impact;234 an understanding of the history of govern-
mental treatment that has led to the subordination of a "suspect 
class";235 a realistic appraisal of the effects a particular measure has 
on the interests of a "suspect class"; and, of course, a thorough 
factual understanding of the government's purpose in wittingly or 
unwittingly subjecting members of a "suspect class" to particular 
disadvantages.236 Grounding its notion of "discrimination" in the 
workings of actual power relationships in a democracy, the antisub-
jugation principle thus marks out a realistic middle course between 
the Davis line of cases' narrow focus on only the perpetrator of a 
discriminatory act and a more substantive, equality-of-condition-
based definition of constitutional equal protection. 
The antisubjugation principle, as a blueprint for constrained 
and principled judicial activism, asserts that an inference of pur-
poseful discrimination drawn from the deprivations actually and 
foreseeably caused by a government's action is justified only where 
such deprivations recall a tradition of purposeful discrimination 
that has brought about the subordination of the affected group 
through similar means. Thus, in Feeney,237 where the Massachusetts 
23S See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
234 See Freeman, supra note 138, at 1066; TRIBE, supra note 17, at 1518; Tribe, supra note 
229, at 338. 
235 See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 1520. 
236 Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
237 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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veteran's preference statute had the effect of limiting opportunities 
for women in civil service employment, except in low-paying clerical 
jobs,238 the antisubjugation principle would have required the Court 
to weigh heavily the evidence that such disparate treatment exactly 
mirrors the tradition of gender-based employment discrimination 
that has for years resulted in the purposeful confinement of women 
to the secretarial pool. Had the Court placed the veteran's prefer-
ence statute in this broader, more historically realistic background, 
it would likely have found that the Massachusetts statute was itself 
a discriminatory measure that could be justified only by the most 
convincing of state interests. Because equal access to jobs carrying 
power and prestige is an interest that responds particularly to the 
ways in which women traditionally have been subjugated in the po-
litical and economic marketplace, the selective deprivation of the 
interest to women-whether specifically motivated by a desire to 
oppress women or not-most naturally justifies a judicial inference 
of discriminatory intent. 
C. The Antisubjugation Principle in the Abortion Funding Context 
Regardless of the Supreme Court's characterization of the abor-
tion right itself in the abortion funding cases-variously described 
in these cases as an "entitlement,"239 a "liberty interest,"240 and a 
right that may be "denied" without being "impinged"241-under the 
antisubjugation principle the Court could not have continued to 
ignore the real-world impact of abortion-funding restrictions upon 
reaching the "suspect classification" strand of its inquiry. Under the 
"victim perspective," the first question a court must ask in a case of 
de facto discrimination is, "what is the actual effect of the govern-
ment's action in this matter on the interests of this suspect class?" 
As a threshold matter, therefore, the Court would be obliged to 
consider fully the known impact of abortion funding restrictions on 
women of color.242 As Part II of this article suggests, one of the 
most striking features of these restrictions is their predictable denial 
of abortion to women of color who cannot otherwise afford them. 243 
238Id. at 285 (Marshall, j., dissenting) (citing Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 
485, 488 (1976)). 
239 Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). 
240 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989). 
241 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
242 See supra notes 19-66 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
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In the first part of its analysis under the antisubjugation prin-
ciple, a court would determine whether the disparate racial impact 
of abortion funding restrictions is fairly attributable to the history 
of government-sanctioned and otherwise official subjugation of 
women of color, or whether accidental and neutral phenomena 
provide a more adequate explanation. 244 At first blush, the question 
is a close one, as black women in particular have a much higher 
abortion rate than white women, and the cause of this disparity in 
the need for abortion services is not entirely understood.245 That 
black women are also disproportionately represented among 
women who cannot afford to pay for abortion services, however, is 
not nearly so elusive. Black women and other women of color are 
vastly overrepresented among indigent persons and persons depen-
dent upon government services.246 Almost any federal measure that 
specifically classifies according to indigency will therefore have a 
predictable, disparate impact on black women and other women of 
color-even if women of color are not, as they are in the abortion 
context, otherwise overrepresented among the regulated class. 
Taking the impact of abortion funding restrictions as a whole, 
the disparate treatment of women of color under such restrictions 
cannot be explained without reference to the marked concentration 
of women of color among the poor and extreme poor in the United 
States. The more pertinent question under the antisubjugation prin-
ciple, however, is whether the root cause of this disparity is more 
244 See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text. 
245 As noted in Part II, the disparity in both the abortion rates and birthrates of black 
women and white women is directly attributable to the higher pregnancy rates of black 
women. See Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 24, at 102. To the extent that the abortion 
rates of a group of women, taken independently of the birthrate, is a predictable function 
of that group's pregnancy rate, it is fair at least to suggest that the disproportionately high 
demand of black women for abortion services may stem in part from the lower rate of 
contraceptive use among black women. See William D. Mosher & James W. McNally, Contra-
ceptive Use at First Premarital Intercourse, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 108, 110-11 (1991). If this is 
the case, the lack of information many black women receive concerning contraceptive services, 
and the reduced availability of these services to women of lower incomes, are at the core of 
the racial disproportionality in abortion rates. Elise F. Jones & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, 
Contraceptive Failure Rates Based on the 1988 NSFG, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12,7 (30.8% of black 
women and 22.4% of white women with family incomes less than $23,211 experience con-
traceptive failure among V.S. women generally within the first year of use; contraceptive 
failure among V.S. women generally is 13.8% within first year of use); Gold & Daley, supra 
note 19, at 208 ("In constant 1980 dollars, total V.S. expenditures for contraceptive services 
fell by 34% between 1980 and 1990, despite an increase from 1982 through 1988 in the 
number of women at risk of an unintended pregnancy"). Such factors cannot plausibly be 
attributed to the inherent characteristics of, or conscious choices by, women of color. 
246 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
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likely than not a manifestation of the specific historical oppression 
of women of color. After hundreds of years of discrimination in 
employment, wages, education, housing, health care, and political 
access, a court would not have to be insensitive so much as it would 
have to be utterly disconnected from historical reality to attribute 
the disproportionate poverty of women of color to accidental or 
neutral phenomena in the real world. 
The second part of an inquiry under the antisubjugation prin-
ciple would require a court to consider the power relationships 
involved in restricting funding for abortion, the history of govern-
mental treatment that has led to the subordination of women of 
color as a "suspect class," the effects of funding restrictions on the 
interests of women of color, and the government's purpose in wit-
tingly or unwittingly subjecting women of color to particular dis-
advantage by restricting public funding. 247 Each of these consider-
ations, and all of them taken together, lead a court in determining 
whether the disparate racial impact of abortion funding restrictions 
appropriately justifies an inference of discriminatory intent on the 
part of government. For its similarity to a court's present inquiry 
under the antidiscrimination principle, the last of these considera-
tions will be taken first. 
It is, of course, quite deliberate that the Hyde Amendment and 
other restrictions on abortion funding deprive abortions only to 
indigent women. During the congressional debates on the Hyde 
Amendment, Representative Henry Hyde acknowledged that a 
more natural way for Congress to serve the goal of protecting fetal 
life would be simply to ban abortion altogether.248 Representative 
Hyde argued, however, that as such a measure would clearly be 
invalid under Roe v. Wade,249 the best Congress could do would be 
to deny the right to obtain an abortion only to poor women.250 If 
Congress wanted to force as many women as possible to surrender 
their right to an abortion and to carry their unwanted pregnancies 
to term, Hyde and his fellow legislators would simply have to accept 
the fact that the deprivations wrought by unwanted pregnanCies 
would be visited only on indigent women.251 
'47 See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. 
'48 123 THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H6083 (Daily ed. June 17, 1977) (statement of Rep. 
Henry J. Hyde) . 
• 49 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
'50 123 THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H6083 (Daily ed. June 17, 1977) (statement of Rep. 
Henry J. Hyde). 
'
51 Id. 
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Thus, barring a level of detachment unbefitting a legislative 
body, the disparate impact of abortion-funding restrictions on 
women of color was both foreseeable and foreseen by Congress and 
by other legislatures that have passed such restrictions. Faced with 
the choice to force only some unwanted childbirths or none at all, 
Congress committed itself to a course of action that it knew would 
affect only women in the lowest socioeconomic strata. Although this 
level of intent would clearly not be sufficient under the antidiscri-
mination principle to qualify as "purposeful discrimination" against 
women of color,252 the "victim perspective" of the antisubjugation 
principle would require a court to take a much closer look at the 
actual nature of the deprivation acceded to by Congress and the 
relatedness of this deprivation to a tradition of intentional subju-
gation. 
With respect to the interest deprived, a court might note that 
a woman's interest in unrestricted access to abortion is similar, in 
many respects, to the interest of a black individual in the abolition 
of slavery or of a Catholic person in the United States in the con-
stitutional prohibition against established religion.253 Characteristics 
like these that are, for all intents and purposes, "immutable"-a 
person's religion, her color, or her ability to give birth-bear no 
relationship to the ability of citizens to perform meritoriously in the 
political and economic marketplace. That much, hopefully, is 
known. Yet, because these same characteristics have been trans-
formed over history into barriers against the individual self-ad-
vancement of persons who possess them, any interest that is directly 
allied with their protection- that is, with the "protection" of their 
irrelevance in the political and economic marketplace-is in many 
respects tantamount to a basic personal interest in the constitutional 
promise of equal political and economic opportunity. 254 
From the "victim perspective," then, the interest of a particular 
group of women in unrestricted access to abortion, whether that 
interest is characterized as a "fundamental right," a "relational 
right," or merely a "liberty interest," becomes stronger as the sys-
temic ideal of meritocracy becomes more and more remote. It is in 
such a situation, where an interest that is allied with the full partic-
ipation of a particular group is at its strongest and the constitutional 
252 See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. See also Tribe, supra note 229, at 337. 
254 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. 
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ideal of meritocracy correspondingly at its nadir, that the anti sub-
jugation principle most naturally warrants an inference of purpose-
ful discrimination~ 255 
There is an immediate and obvious connection between a 
woman of color's interest in a publicly-funded abortion and her 
interest in overcoming the legacy of government-sanctioned racial 
discrimination that has resulted in her political and economic dis-
empowerment. As several of the studies in Part II indicate, black 
women who receive some form of public assistance are much less 
likely ever to break out of the "welfare trap" when they experience 
a mistimed pregnancy that results in an unwanted birth.256 In the 
absence of public funding, twenty to twenty-five percent of women 
who would avoid this result by obtaining an abortion are forced 
into unwanted childbirth.257 For the others, raising the money to 
pay for an abortion will result in delay, increased health risks, and 
greater costs258-another kind of "trap" that public funding restric-
tions inevitably create. The need for women of color to have control 
over whether they will give birth to children they have not planned, 
cannot afford, should not carry for medical reasons, or simply do 
not want, thus touches an interest in the promise of meritocracy 
that is unparalleled among women for whom this promise has been 
more satisfactorily fulfilled. To the extent that women of color have 
been placed in this position by the historical willingness of govern-
ment to sanction and even mandate their oppression, any present 
effort by government to prevent women of color from breaking out 
of the "traps" set by their history of subjugation might naturally be 
viewed merely as an extension of this cruel history. In such cases, 
the antisubjugation principle requires an inference of intentional 
discrimination that can be overcome only by the most compelling 
of governmental interests. 
255 See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. 
256 See, e.g., Greg]. Juncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Welfare Receipt and Subsequent 
Dependence Among Black Adolescent Mothers, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 16 (1990); Laurie S. Zabin 
et aI., When Urban Adolescents Choose Abortion: Effects on Education, Psychological Status and 
Subsequent Pregnancy, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 248 (1989). See also Susan]. Zuravin, Unplanned 
Childbearing and Family Size: Their Relationship to Neglect and Child Abuse, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 
155 (1991). 
257 Aida Torres et aI., Public Benefits and Costs of Government Funding for Abortion, 18 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. Ill, 117 (1986); Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 39, at 171; Trussell et aI., 
supra note 40, at 129; see also GOLD, supra note 36, at 51 (range of 20% to 25% of women 
unable to pay for an abortion therefore carry unwanted pregnancies to term). 
258 See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The current doctrine of equal protection will not support a 
claim of racially disparate impact against restrictions on the public 
funding of abortion. With respect to the "fundamental rights" com-
ponent of equal protection, the Supreme Court has evolved a doc-
trine that dismisses the denial of abortion through funding restric-
tions as no form of "impingement" on the underlying "right" to an 
abortion. Moreover, the Court has indicated in its recent decisions 
that it may be poised to abandon the abortion right altogether, a 
development which, while it would plainly be of no consequence in 
the area of abortion funding, would have profound effects on the 
lives of women throughout the United States. 
With respect to the "suspect classification" component of equal 
protection, the Court has made it abundantly clear that statistical 
disparities in the impact of a facially-neutral law will ordinarily carry 
little weight without direct evidence of discriminatory intent. In the 
abortion funding context, claims of de facto racial discrimination will 
therefore fail. It makes very little difference that the deprivations 
wrought by funding restrictions can be among the most severe to 
befall a human being; cases like McClesky illustrate that the Court 
will demand discriminatory intent even where the very life of a 
citizen is at stake. 
The antisubjugation principle offers an alternative to the 
Court's current doctrine that would restore to equal protection an 
appropriate substantive content in the real world of human inter-
action. Drawing on a strong (if recently neglected) theme in equal 
protection law that uses the constitutional ideals of meritocracy and 
equality of opportunity as guideposts for judicial activism, the an-
tisubjugation principle provides a perspective from which neither 
the realities of "unintentional" discrimination nor the limits of le-
gitimate judicial action are ignored. Applying these principles in 
the context of abortion funding, the profoundly disparate impact 
of funding restrictions on the lives of women of color, coupled with 
the government-sanctioned tradition of discrimination that has cre-
ated and perpetuated this disparity, warrant and require an infer-
ence of intentional governmental discrimination. That such an anal-
ysis is not likely to be forthcoming from the present Court does not 
diminish its value to a political system that, while ignoring the 
substantial burdens it has historically placed on the lives of women 
of color, purports to base itself on the constitutional ideals of equal-
ity of opportunity and meritocracy. 

